Policy Brief: Bulgaria’s July 5 parliamentary elections
As the economy is down in Bulgaria, politics is up. While real economy companies suffer, there is a boom of start ups, desiring to enter Parliament – and even to jump into government. And literally, campaign money is keeping afloat many businesses, including media, PR and public polling agencies and individual citizens.
The upcoming general elections on July 5 2009 are highly unpredictable as in terms of composition of Parliament as well as the composition of the post-election coalition to form a government.
Four parties are considered a sure bid to pass the four per cent threshold and another three or four can make it too, judging by the results of the European Parliament elections held a month ago.
It is still an open question whether these results can be sustained or further improved. While the basic players are known, the performance of the smaller parties will hold the key to many questions.
The distribution of seats is also very much dependent on the turnout as the lower turnout has been in favour of parties with lock votes or those rigging the elections.
Thus the swing vote will be important and any additional party with seats will make a huge difference as all of them are ambitious players with chances to be in the next government.
The "majority element" of these elections next to the proportional system will introduce an even higher uncertainty as 31 MPs out of 240 in total will be elected to different, majority. In fact, the majority candidates, despite that most of them are also party nominations, may upset many preconceived plans and coalition calculations.
The turnout expected to be higher than the 37.49 per cent in the June 2009 EP elections, but still not higher than 50 per cent and the attitude reflects both the public aversion about anything "political", record low trust in institutions as well as the belief that their voice would not matter anyway (18 per cent vs 93 per cent for the Danes in a 2008 EU-wide Eurobarometer survey), an alarming signal.
An OSCE election monitoring mission adds to the context of elections, as the organisation registered certain regress in democracy in the country – with legal hindrances to opposition parties, "vote buying" and "controlled votes" blemishing the democratic process.
A Civic Coalition for Free and Democratic Choice elections put the "controlled vote" in the 2009 European Parliament elections at 16 per cent.
As no party is expected to have a landslide victory, the elections will most likely be followed by messy negotiations to form a government.
The more parties enter Parliament, the more protracted and complicated the bargaining will be. There may be resemblances of the similar stalemate four years ago and negotiations bringing about the current uneasy tripartite coalition, led by the BSP’s Coalition for Bulgaria on the mandate of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
Tough guys don't dance: the main contenders
The opposition centre-right GERB (Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria) of current Sofia mayor Boiko Borissov will win most of the votes as it leads in opinion polls for more than two years, won in two EP elections in 2007 and 2009 and municipal ones in 2007. But they will fall short of seats.
The problem with GERB is that it is a new party, revolving around the populist appeal of its leader Borissov, and its shaky periphery of support is unreliable.
In contrast, GERB’s arch-enemies in this campaign – the currently governing BSP and MRF parties - feature strong loyal cores and ability to mobilise supporters.
For the record, they are not formally in a coalition but their level of campaign co-ordination leaves no doubts about it.
The incumbent Bulgarian Socialist Party (ex-communists) is still the largest, most organised and able to mobilise vast support across the country.
It runs in a coalition – Coalition for Bulgaria – with smaller, satellite parties (communists, nationalists and social democrats among them) and though they add a few votes they are overshadowed by their mighty partners.
The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) is the Turkish minority party under the unflinching leadership of Ahmed Dogan since its establishment in 1990 and it hold the monopoly on the votes of the Turkish community as well as many Bulgarian Muslims and some Roma.
Dogan is master of identity politics and follows the principle "the worse the better" – the more threatened feels the minority the more votes for the MRF. MRF has unique place in Bulgaria’s politics as it has been virtually the king maker of every president of the country and nearly all governments as the necessary "balancer".
To complete the picture of the "big four" is the extreme nationalist Ataka party, also a relatively new creation (2005).
Ataka garners quite a lot of support not only by its nationalist (and often but racist) slogans, but also be its anti-corruption and anti-establishment rhetoric. Despite the many controversies over the leadership style party and dubious choices of candidates, it garners quite a support and it is growing, taking away supporters by bigger parties like the BSP and GERB.
Comebacks and debutants
The group of the parties relying on a big comeback is presented by the Blue Coalition and the National Movement for Stability and Progress, a.k.a. "king’s party".
The centre-right Blue Coalition consists of the two main shipwrecks of the once mighty Union of the Democratic Forces – the reformist anti-communist opposition of the early transition.
There is the smaller, but more homogeneous and tightly knit (to the extent of being dubbed a "sect") Democrats for Strong Bulgaria of former Prime Minister and former UDF leader Ivan Kostov and the larger but more fragile Union of Democratic Forces.
Though the parties basically used to loathe each other, they’ve managed to come together winning reputable 7.95 per cent at the EP elections – a far cry from the two to three per cent support for each party before joined forces for a coalition.
The party of the formerly royal and formerly charismatic king Simeon managed to pull an incredible 7.96 per cent of votes in the EP election, far above the one to three per cent that the opinion polls previously suggested.
The results were largely due to the highly popular European Commissioner Meglena Kouneva, who led the party list and literally drew the party from the brink.
But it is unclear whether the magic can be repeated again (unless, as alleged, the MRF gives a helping hand again with a few votes).
The NMSP, despite being part of the governing coalition, was often at odds with the other two partners and tried to distance itself as "intra-coalition" opposition.
The debutant group is represented by the LIDER (Liberal Initiative for Democratic European Development) and the Order, Law and Justice parties. They are both relatively new parties and a symptom (although not the inventors per se) of the changing nature of politics in Bulgaria.
LIDER was established and is run by Bulgarian tycoon Hristo Kovachki, who has extensive political connections and is considered very close to the MRF party. Both his business and political practices are allegedly rather controversial, including the mass application of "corporate vote", i.e. "persuading" his workers to vote for him.
The Order, Law and Justice party of Yane Yanev has an interesting career, raising many eyebrows along the way. After being an agrarian for some years, Yanev reinvented himself as a conservative, legitimised by closer ties with the British Tories.
The BSP Interior Minister Mihail Mikov has claimed that Yanev is "a product of the secret services and unsatisfied business interests (sic)".
While this cannot be corroborated, Yanev has managed to quickly gain significant support by his anti-corruption rhetoric and has substantial chances to enter Parliament.
Both Lider and OLJ are self-described centre-right parties. But trying to predict coalition patterns based on some "ideological affiliations" can be misleading because there are other factors and relations at work.
Also, the sudden abundance of new "centre right" and the conclusion that Bulgarians are centre-right minded falls short, as there is enough evidence that many left-wing voters (and candidates) are attracted by GERB or Ataka. Probably a plausible, if very simplistic explanation is that the BSP is too mighty and no one wants to mess with it by stepping in its territory.
More than meets the eye: possible combinations?
GERB and BSP are the two centers of gravity and everyone will be dancing around them.
Given recent history of the 2005 elections when an improbable at first sight coalition (i.e. the current governing one) was formed, now the combinations are much more numerous depending on the results and the consequent bargaining. No one should be excluded a priory from calculations – including Ataka and MRF – even if they stand out for now as the most unwanted partners.
It is not very clear where the NMSP stands – it has many similarities and affinities with the centre right – but it is also due a few favours to its former coalition partners of BSP and especially MRF.
This gives it quite a favourable position and may be part of any configuration – be it on the GERB and centre-right or with a BSP-led one.
There are several scenarios based on a larger number – up to nine - parties entering Parliament.
But again, these are very tentative scenarios as just few seats can make huge difference in parties’ partner preferences. It may be the case that a party supports a given government coalition without joining it directly.
"Me, myself and GERB" is the desired, but highly improbable plan of Sofia mayor Boiko Borissov, who reiterated aversion of any coalition arrangements that will tie his hands and wants GERB-only government;
"EPP dream team" is GERB plus the Blue Coalition, all members of the European People’s Party. But while the Blue Coalition were repeatedly rebuffed by Borissov (but not rejected), the hopes are vested on EPP brokered arrangement after the elections. There is an increasing probability that NMSP will join the EPP members as a third partner, provided that Borissov never burned the bridges to Simeon and that their policy positions are similar to those of the Blue Coalition. There is also the possibility of GERB and/or the Blue Coalition drawing Ataka or OLJ, but then the scenario will be neither "EPP" nor "dream team".
"The dynamic duo" scenario includes BSP and MRF managing to take the upper hand and govern together or with the help of the smaller parties gravitating around them – the current partner NMSP the OLJ or LIDER and depending on the choice the influence in the
coalition will be tilted either to BSP (if OLJ is chosen) or to MRF (if LIDER is chosen), but it will not make that much difference. For the record, MRF is not particularly liked among BSP voters and he makes his best to be unpopular, e.g. by recently proclaiming himself "the
instrument that allocates the portions of financing in the state".
"Grand coalition for national salvation" is a very likely possibility, very much discussed, but it may be messy. Ahmed Dogan, whose "prognoses" are often outlines of his own plans, opted for a big, shaky coalition, which will crumble in less than a year to give way for the real thing. Just in 2005, the BSP, MRF and Simeon’s NMSP entered into at first sight improbable for the casual voter coalition, brokered by President Purvanov – who by all accounts might also intervene again. As the 2005 coalition was in the name of "EU membership", this will be a "anti-crisis, national consensus" one.
The scenario may be acceptable to some extend if put on firmer grounds and with clear limits and commitments of the partners. But it will be highly undesirable if it is too big and heterogeneous and as a result lacking accountability and unmanageable.
An "expert government" may be some sub-scenario, but while tempting at first sight, the scenario is undesired as the political responsibility of "experts" will be even more diluted or missing.
Policy implications for the anti-crisis response
The economic crisis has been the backdrop of the elections but it has only indirectly informed voters’ preferences.
The competing messages are stability vs change – and it is up to the voters to decide what they find more reassuring. Two of the governing parties – BSP and MRF - are banking very much on "you don’t change horses in midstream" message about stability and predictability, warning that change and reform will be dangerous in precarious times.
The opposition parties’ message is the need to change the government, which will endanger the country at a time of crisis.
A centre-right government of GERB or/and the Blue Coalition will have – well, a centre-right policy.
They will lead an austerity policy, sign an arrangement with the IMF. GERB has just recently managed to fill a huge gap – human capacity and especially the lack of a strong economic team – by signing the support of Simeon Djankov, a world level World Bank Senior Economist and creator of the Doing Business survey (assuming he will play more than an advisory role).
Among the ideas that may be promoted by such team is a robust structural reform in healthcare and education, using the crisis context as a springboard, not pretext to bloat them for another couple of decades.
The BSP’s current anti-crisis plan combines social protection, maintenance of jobs and massive public investments. While not particularly bad on paper, it has been criticised for risking low efficiency of the investments if they go into the wrong hands as well as stopping short of bolder measures to prevent, not react to the crisis.
The government also indulged in some pre-election spending, instead of embracing austerity measures. Also on the eve of elections, the BSP has shied from its mostly liberal economic policies, denounced any IMF deal and emphasised once again its "social" side to appeal with its left-wing support base of pensioners and lower income village and small-town dwellers. But after all, there are elections to be won and the aftermath reality might dictate otherwise.
www.eupi.eu
Marin Lessenski is a policy analyst with the European Policies Initiative (EuPI) of OSI-Sofia. This policy brief is commissioned by the European Policies Initiative (EuPI) of the Open Society Institute – Sofia.
The policy brief series is a product of the European Policies Initiative (EuPI), aimed at providing independent expert commentary and analysis on key issues on EU’s new member states agenda.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Open Society Institute –Sofia.
Please, check EuPI’s web-site at www.eupi.eu regularly for new policy briefs, other publications and events. You can subscribe to EuPI’s updates via the RSS or the subscription services at the bottom of the web-page.
© 2009, Open Society Institute – Sofia
The European Policy Initiative (EuPI) aims at stimulating and assisting new Member States from CEE to develop capacity for constructive co-authorship of common European policies at both government and civil society level. As a new priority area of the European Policies and Civic Participation Program of Open Society Institute – Sofia, EuPI will contribute to improving the capacity of new Member States to effectively impact common European policies through quality research, policy recommendations, networking and advocacy. The initiative operates in the ten new Member States from CEE through a network of experts and policy institutes.
The upcoming general elections on July 5 2009 are highly unpredictable as in terms of composition of Parliament as well as the composition of the post-election coalition to form a government.
Four parties are considered a sure bid to pass the four per cent threshold and another three or four can make it too, judging by the results of the European Parliament elections held a month ago.
It is still an open question whether these results can be sustained or further improved. While the basic players are known, the performance of the smaller parties will hold the key to many questions.
The distribution of seats is also very much dependent on the turnout as the lower turnout has been in favour of parties with lock votes or those rigging the elections.
Thus the swing vote will be important and any additional party with seats will make a huge difference as all of them are ambitious players with chances to be in the next government.
The "majority element" of these elections next to the proportional system will introduce an even higher uncertainty as 31 MPs out of 240 in total will be elected to different, majority. In fact, the majority candidates, despite that most of them are also party nominations, may upset many preconceived plans and coalition calculations.
The turnout expected to be higher than the 37.49 per cent in the June 2009 EP elections, but still not higher than 50 per cent and the attitude reflects both the public aversion about anything "political", record low trust in institutions as well as the belief that their voice would not matter anyway (18 per cent vs 93 per cent for the Danes in a 2008 EU-wide Eurobarometer survey), an alarming signal.
An OSCE election monitoring mission adds to the context of elections, as the organisation registered certain regress in democracy in the country – with legal hindrances to opposition parties, "vote buying" and "controlled votes" blemishing the democratic process.
A Civic Coalition for Free and Democratic Choice elections put the "controlled vote" in the 2009 European Parliament elections at 16 per cent.
As no party is expected to have a landslide victory, the elections will most likely be followed by messy negotiations to form a government.
The more parties enter Parliament, the more protracted and complicated the bargaining will be. There may be resemblances of the similar stalemate four years ago and negotiations bringing about the current uneasy tripartite coalition, led by the BSP’s Coalition for Bulgaria on the mandate of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
Tough guys don't dance: the main contenders
The opposition centre-right GERB (Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria) of current Sofia mayor Boiko Borissov will win most of the votes as it leads in opinion polls for more than two years, won in two EP elections in 2007 and 2009 and municipal ones in 2007. But they will fall short of seats.
The problem with GERB is that it is a new party, revolving around the populist appeal of its leader Borissov, and its shaky periphery of support is unreliable.
In contrast, GERB’s arch-enemies in this campaign – the currently governing BSP and MRF parties - feature strong loyal cores and ability to mobilise supporters.
For the record, they are not formally in a coalition but their level of campaign co-ordination leaves no doubts about it.
The incumbent Bulgarian Socialist Party (ex-communists) is still the largest, most organised and able to mobilise vast support across the country.
It runs in a coalition – Coalition for Bulgaria – with smaller, satellite parties (communists, nationalists and social democrats among them) and though they add a few votes they are overshadowed by their mighty partners.
The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) is the Turkish minority party under the unflinching leadership of Ahmed Dogan since its establishment in 1990 and it hold the monopoly on the votes of the Turkish community as well as many Bulgarian Muslims and some Roma.
Dogan is master of identity politics and follows the principle "the worse the better" – the more threatened feels the minority the more votes for the MRF. MRF has unique place in Bulgaria’s politics as it has been virtually the king maker of every president of the country and nearly all governments as the necessary "balancer".
To complete the picture of the "big four" is the extreme nationalist Ataka party, also a relatively new creation (2005).
Ataka garners quite a lot of support not only by its nationalist (and often but racist) slogans, but also be its anti-corruption and anti-establishment rhetoric. Despite the many controversies over the leadership style party and dubious choices of candidates, it garners quite a support and it is growing, taking away supporters by bigger parties like the BSP and GERB.
Comebacks and debutants
The group of the parties relying on a big comeback is presented by the Blue Coalition and the National Movement for Stability and Progress, a.k.a. "king’s party".
The centre-right Blue Coalition consists of the two main shipwrecks of the once mighty Union of the Democratic Forces – the reformist anti-communist opposition of the early transition.
There is the smaller, but more homogeneous and tightly knit (to the extent of being dubbed a "sect") Democrats for Strong Bulgaria of former Prime Minister and former UDF leader Ivan Kostov and the larger but more fragile Union of Democratic Forces.
Though the parties basically used to loathe each other, they’ve managed to come together winning reputable 7.95 per cent at the EP elections – a far cry from the two to three per cent support for each party before joined forces for a coalition.
The party of the formerly royal and formerly charismatic king Simeon managed to pull an incredible 7.96 per cent of votes in the EP election, far above the one to three per cent that the opinion polls previously suggested.
The results were largely due to the highly popular European Commissioner Meglena Kouneva, who led the party list and literally drew the party from the brink.
But it is unclear whether the magic can be repeated again (unless, as alleged, the MRF gives a helping hand again with a few votes).
The NMSP, despite being part of the governing coalition, was often at odds with the other two partners and tried to distance itself as "intra-coalition" opposition.
The debutant group is represented by the LIDER (Liberal Initiative for Democratic European Development) and the Order, Law and Justice parties. They are both relatively new parties and a symptom (although not the inventors per se) of the changing nature of politics in Bulgaria.
LIDER was established and is run by Bulgarian tycoon Hristo Kovachki, who has extensive political connections and is considered very close to the MRF party. Both his business and political practices are allegedly rather controversial, including the mass application of "corporate vote", i.e. "persuading" his workers to vote for him.
The Order, Law and Justice party of Yane Yanev has an interesting career, raising many eyebrows along the way. After being an agrarian for some years, Yanev reinvented himself as a conservative, legitimised by closer ties with the British Tories.
The BSP Interior Minister Mihail Mikov has claimed that Yanev is "a product of the secret services and unsatisfied business interests (sic)".
While this cannot be corroborated, Yanev has managed to quickly gain significant support by his anti-corruption rhetoric and has substantial chances to enter Parliament.
Both Lider and OLJ are self-described centre-right parties. But trying to predict coalition patterns based on some "ideological affiliations" can be misleading because there are other factors and relations at work.
Also, the sudden abundance of new "centre right" and the conclusion that Bulgarians are centre-right minded falls short, as there is enough evidence that many left-wing voters (and candidates) are attracted by GERB or Ataka. Probably a plausible, if very simplistic explanation is that the BSP is too mighty and no one wants to mess with it by stepping in its territory.
More than meets the eye: possible combinations?
GERB and BSP are the two centers of gravity and everyone will be dancing around them.
Given recent history of the 2005 elections when an improbable at first sight coalition (i.e. the current governing one) was formed, now the combinations are much more numerous depending on the results and the consequent bargaining. No one should be excluded a priory from calculations – including Ataka and MRF – even if they stand out for now as the most unwanted partners.
It is not very clear where the NMSP stands – it has many similarities and affinities with the centre right – but it is also due a few favours to its former coalition partners of BSP and especially MRF.
This gives it quite a favourable position and may be part of any configuration – be it on the GERB and centre-right or with a BSP-led one.
There are several scenarios based on a larger number – up to nine - parties entering Parliament.
But again, these are very tentative scenarios as just few seats can make huge difference in parties’ partner preferences. It may be the case that a party supports a given government coalition without joining it directly.
"Me, myself and GERB" is the desired, but highly improbable plan of Sofia mayor Boiko Borissov, who reiterated aversion of any coalition arrangements that will tie his hands and wants GERB-only government;
"EPP dream team" is GERB plus the Blue Coalition, all members of the European People’s Party. But while the Blue Coalition were repeatedly rebuffed by Borissov (but not rejected), the hopes are vested on EPP brokered arrangement after the elections. There is an increasing probability that NMSP will join the EPP members as a third partner, provided that Borissov never burned the bridges to Simeon and that their policy positions are similar to those of the Blue Coalition. There is also the possibility of GERB and/or the Blue Coalition drawing Ataka or OLJ, but then the scenario will be neither "EPP" nor "dream team".
"The dynamic duo" scenario includes BSP and MRF managing to take the upper hand and govern together or with the help of the smaller parties gravitating around them – the current partner NMSP the OLJ or LIDER and depending on the choice the influence in the
coalition will be tilted either to BSP (if OLJ is chosen) or to MRF (if LIDER is chosen), but it will not make that much difference. For the record, MRF is not particularly liked among BSP voters and he makes his best to be unpopular, e.g. by recently proclaiming himself "the
instrument that allocates the portions of financing in the state".
"Grand coalition for national salvation" is a very likely possibility, very much discussed, but it may be messy. Ahmed Dogan, whose "prognoses" are often outlines of his own plans, opted for a big, shaky coalition, which will crumble in less than a year to give way for the real thing. Just in 2005, the BSP, MRF and Simeon’s NMSP entered into at first sight improbable for the casual voter coalition, brokered by President Purvanov – who by all accounts might also intervene again. As the 2005 coalition was in the name of "EU membership", this will be a "anti-crisis, national consensus" one.
The scenario may be acceptable to some extend if put on firmer grounds and with clear limits and commitments of the partners. But it will be highly undesirable if it is too big and heterogeneous and as a result lacking accountability and unmanageable.
An "expert government" may be some sub-scenario, but while tempting at first sight, the scenario is undesired as the political responsibility of "experts" will be even more diluted or missing.
Policy implications for the anti-crisis response
The economic crisis has been the backdrop of the elections but it has only indirectly informed voters’ preferences.
The competing messages are stability vs change – and it is up to the voters to decide what they find more reassuring. Two of the governing parties – BSP and MRF - are banking very much on "you don’t change horses in midstream" message about stability and predictability, warning that change and reform will be dangerous in precarious times.
The opposition parties’ message is the need to change the government, which will endanger the country at a time of crisis.
A centre-right government of GERB or/and the Blue Coalition will have – well, a centre-right policy.
They will lead an austerity policy, sign an arrangement with the IMF. GERB has just recently managed to fill a huge gap – human capacity and especially the lack of a strong economic team – by signing the support of Simeon Djankov, a world level World Bank Senior Economist and creator of the Doing Business survey (assuming he will play more than an advisory role).
Among the ideas that may be promoted by such team is a robust structural reform in healthcare and education, using the crisis context as a springboard, not pretext to bloat them for another couple of decades.
The BSP’s current anti-crisis plan combines social protection, maintenance of jobs and massive public investments. While not particularly bad on paper, it has been criticised for risking low efficiency of the investments if they go into the wrong hands as well as stopping short of bolder measures to prevent, not react to the crisis.
The government also indulged in some pre-election spending, instead of embracing austerity measures. Also on the eve of elections, the BSP has shied from its mostly liberal economic policies, denounced any IMF deal and emphasised once again its "social" side to appeal with its left-wing support base of pensioners and lower income village and small-town dwellers. But after all, there are elections to be won and the aftermath reality might dictate otherwise.
www.eupi.eu
Marin Lessenski is a policy analyst with the European Policies Initiative (EuPI) of OSI-Sofia. This policy brief is commissioned by the European Policies Initiative (EuPI) of the Open Society Institute – Sofia.
The policy brief series is a product of the European Policies Initiative (EuPI), aimed at providing independent expert commentary and analysis on key issues on EU’s new member states agenda.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Open Society Institute –Sofia.
Please, check EuPI’s web-site at www.eupi.eu regularly for new policy briefs, other publications and events. You can subscribe to EuPI’s updates via the RSS or the subscription services at the bottom of the web-page.
© 2009, Open Society Institute – Sofia
The European Policy Initiative (EuPI) aims at stimulating and assisting new Member States from CEE to develop capacity for constructive co-authorship of common European policies at both government and civil society level. As a new priority area of the European Policies and Civic Participation Program of Open Society Institute – Sofia, EuPI will contribute to improving the capacity of new Member States to effectively impact common European policies through quality research, policy recommendations, networking and advocacy. The initiative operates in the ten new Member States from CEE through a network of experts and policy institutes.