Turkey has been steadily moving away from the West in recent years and pursuing its own policy that some experts refer to as Eurasian, and the Transatlantic public opinion survey of 12 European countries and the US showed that Turkish people approve that. The downward trend in Turkey-US relations was there since the Iraqi war, when Turkey denied American troops access to its territory. Americans were then mad at Turkey, to say the least, and further frictions followed when Turkey warmed to Syria and Iran. Turkey has recently also developed a security co-operation with Iran. And this year, the US named Iran security threat number one. Turkey also managed to antagonise Israel and the powerful Israeli lobby in the US after prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan referred to Israel’s policy as state terrorism. There is another thing that concerns Bulgaria also. Turkey opposes US policy in the Black Sea region and south Caucasus by not allowing the Nato navy to enter the Black Sea region at a time when the US wants to expand the Nato anti-terrorist operation from the eastern Mediterranean to the Black Sea. (There is another dimension to Turkey-US relations): Whenever Turkey’s relations with the US deteriorate its relations with its eastern neighbours improve. I mean Iran and especially Russia. The Turkey-Russian partnership started several years ago. Russia is the second trading partner of Turkey after Germany and its energy resources are the primary vehicles of Turkish economy. There are many cases when their interests coincide, especially in the Black Sea region and the south Caucasus. They also share many concerns about the EU. But the most important thing is that they pursue independent Eurasian policies. For centuries, the Russian and Turkish empires have been enemies, and now they are very good friends. The US, of course, does not like this.
Will this friendship weigh down heavier than that with the EU?
It could become an alternative if Turkey at some point decides that the West has offended it too much. If the EU and Turkey decide on a strategic partnership now, it could benefit both sides. Their relations now are very emotional. Turkey is offended by the EU because it put its negotiations off for too long. Its candidate status was agreed to in 1999 and negotiations started in 2005. For six years, the Turkish had enough time to think they were offended. And the EU sometimes pushes Turkey too much.
Wouldn’t having bad relations with the US make Turkey a better friend of the EU?
These are separate things. Currently, the Turkish secular establishment is angry both at the US for its policies, because they see US influence in the Middle East as something bad for Turkey, and at the EU, because they think that it supplies double standards; and that central and eastern European states were tolerated because they were Christian.
Will the Pope’s statement give fuel to this idea?
Absolutely; along with the revival of the issue of Christianity in the EU constitution, which German chancellor Angela Merkel recently brought up. There is something very wrong in Turkey’s understanding of accession. The acquis is not negotiable, and Turkey is negotiating it.
Is Turkey slipping from the hands of the EU? Turkish novelist Eli Shafak, who wrote about the plight of Armenians, has said that court cases like hers attempt to stop Turkey’s accession.
I don’t think Turkey will recognise the genocide soon. And since this is a condition of EU membership, Turkey will probably halt negotiations. Turkey would do that whenever they think negotiations don’t fit their national interest. They will not enter the EU at any price. EU Commissioner Olli Rehn is trying to avert a train wreck, as he said, by moving the Cyprus issue for next year. He will probably put the question before the European Court, and until they take a decision there will be another year for negotiations. Of course, neither side wants to stop the process completely. By accepting Turkey, the EU would become a powerful geopolitical player, especially in the Middle East (ME). But Turkey also has a colonial past in the region. So there would be ME concerns that Turkey would want to re-establish their empire, which is why Turkey did not send troops to Iraq, at least not officially. They sent troops to Kurdistan in north Iraq because the Iraqis didn’t want their former colonial master to claim lands like Kirkuk, which is populated by Turkmen as well. It is the same with Lebanon. The pros and cons should be estimated carefully.
What goes on in Turkish intellectual circles regarding the EU?
There is a rift. On the one hand, you have the secular establishment of the bureaucracy and the military that we can conditionally call the Ankara circle. They think some EU demands threaten Turkish national security. And those demands include the rights of minorities because Kurdish terrorism is on the surge in Turkey - there were several blasts in summer resorts. So, this establishment is sceptic toward EU accession, even if it was educated in Western universities and speaks several Western languages. The other circle is more liberal. We can conditionally call them the Istanbul circle. They are more ready to accept demands for democratisation, claims to recognise Cyprus, and discussions on sensitive issues. But we should not forget that the Justice and Development Party now in power does not have good relations with any of the two sides.
