On February 2, UN Special for Envoy for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari presented his long-awaited draft proposal for Serbia’s much disputed province of Kosovo.
According to unofficial reports, the document does not mention the word independence, but it neither speaks about Serbia’s territorial sovereignty.
Nonetheless, from numerous media reports, it became clear that what Ahtisaari was speaking about was indeed a form of independence for Kosovo. Its own flag, national anthem, coat of arms, and constitution are among the many advantages that Kosovo will be granted. Perhaps most importantly, it will be able to apply for membership for international organisations, such as Nato and the EU, and sign international contracts. Economy-wise, Kosovo will be able to participate in a number of financial institutions, and thus receive money from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as implement programmes contracted with them.
The actual document for the plan has not yet been made public. A number of media organisations, including Reuters, claim they have seen the document or even that they have it. But according to Ahtisaari’s spokes person, the plan has not been shown even to the interested sides. Swedish foreign minister Karl Bild said in Pristina that Ahtisaari would bring only a working document, not a final proposal.
Nevertheless, supposed extracts from the document have leaked. Whether they are indeed the “real thing” or not, they give an idea of what is likely to happen to Kosovo’s future status.
The Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) not only claims it has obtained a key section of Ahtisaari’s proposal, but it has also published it on its website. According to this version, Kosovo will adopt a constitution that will prescribe the legal and institutional mechanisms for the protection, promotion, and enforcement of human rights of all persons in Kosovo. It will have the right to negotiate and conclude international agreements, including the right to seek membership of international organisations. Kosovo will have its own, distinct, national symbols, including a flag, seal and anthem, reflecting its multi-ethnic character. The province will have no territorial claims against, and is to seek no union with, any state or part of any state.
The international community will supervise, monitor and have all necessary powers to ensure effective and efficient implementation of this settlement. Municipalities in Kosovo will have the right to inter-municipal and cross-border cooperation on matters of mutual interest in the exercise of their responsibilities.
New municipal boundaries will be delineated in accordance with the Attachment to Annex III of the proposed settlement (BIRN’s website said that it had not obtained the annexes).
Kosovo will have authority over law enforcement, security, justice, public safety, intelligence, civil emergency response and border control on its territory. A new professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force (KSF) will be established, and will develop a lightly armed component, capable of specified security functions. When it has accomplished its goals, including the facilitation of Kosovo’s post-conflict recovery, KSF will be disbanded within one year after the entry into force of the settlement in question.
No later than nine months from the entry into force of the settlement, Kosovo will organise general and municipal elections. They will have to be certified by a competent international authority as having met international standards. An International Steering Group (ISG), comprising key international stakeholders will appoint an International Civilian Representative (ICR) and will seek UN Security Council endorsement of the appointment. The ICR and the EU Special Representative, appointed by the Council of the European Union, will be the same person. The ICR will be entrusted to exercise certain powers to ensure and supervise full implementation of this settlement including the power to take measures, as necessary, to prevent and remedy breaches of this settlement. The mandate of the ICR will continue until the ISG determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of this settlement.
The EU will establish a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission in the field of rule of law. It will assist Kosovo authorities in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent judiciary, police and customs service, ensuring that these institutions are free from political interference and in accordance with internationally recognised standards and European best practices. Furthermore, Nato will establish an International Military Presence (IMP) to support the implementation of the settlement.
Serbian president, Boris Tadic, denounced the plan shortly after its presentation in Belgrade. He warned of a “dangerous political and legal precedent”, if Kosovo became independent. The political bloc led by current Serbian prime minister Vojislav Kostunica further warned of “serious consequences” for every country that recognised Kosovo’s independence. According to a representative of Kostunica’s cabinet, this means that Serbia’s next government would sever diplomatic relations with any country that accepted Kosovo as an independent state.
Kostunica refused to meet Ahtisaari. Kostunica’s adviser, Slobodan Samardjic, said that negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina would not be possible until the new cabinet was formed (Serbia held parliamentary elections on January 21. A new cabinet is still to be formed). Samardjic told Serbian national television that because of this, the negotiation team was not able to implement its responsibilities, nor could it act in any way. He criticised Ahtisaari for his timing in choosing to present his proposal on Kosovo’s status.
Kosovo has been under UN administration since 1999. This happened after Nato’s bombing over Serbia forced Serbian troops to withdraw from Kosovo. Negotiations regarding Kosovo’s status have been going on for years. In January 2006 in Vienna, Kosovo’s and Serbia’s negotiating teams tried to tackle the less contentious issues of decentralisation and protection of cultural heritage under international mediation. But after no compromise was reached, Ahtisaari was tasked to draw up his own proposal for the province’s final status. When he was in Belgrade to present the plan to Tadic, Ahtisaari declared that Serbians and ethnic Albanians had been offered one more chance to reach a compromise about Kosovo’s future status. Reuters said that this meant further negotiations would take place in February.
That more discussions will be on the table after the plan was presented, is certain. But it is not likely that the current version of the plan will be amended, as Serbia simply declines the option for Kosovo to go its own way. What it has to consider, however, is whether it is prepared to fight for what seems as a lost cause, or whether it should take this opportunity to make it easier for another, more plausible cause, its desire for EU membership.
