Let us say that there are two possible routes ahead for Serbia. One is the high road to success, the other is the low road that ultimately leads backwards.

The high road. Soon after the official confirmation of the January 21 election results, president Boris Tadic hands over a mandate that enables the formation of a broad-based pro-Western democratic government that leaves the ultra-nationalists in opposition; UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari releases a report on the future status of Kosovo that, after international engagement, produces a peaceful and workable consensus, which satisfies even Russia which “generously” does not use its United Nations security council veto against the Kosovo proposal; the wanted war criminals are handed over to The Hague, thus meeting the requirements of the European Union and the United States; the way is open for the resumption of discussions on Serbia's possible membership of the EU, notwithstanding the general view that any further engagement is on hold after the admission after the admission of Bulgaria and Romania.

The low road. Negotiations on a coalition government fail, with the major potential partners unable to overcome their differences, notwithstanding the cheerleading of Western countries; the Ahtisaari report crashes in flames, with, among things, Moscow blocking any proposal at security council level; even as Serbia heads for a fresh round of elections, perhaps three months down the road, the war criminals remain elusive; new, discreet discussions begin about how Nato should respond should the situation in Kosovo erupt anew. In whichever compass direction Serbians look, they feel a deepening sense of distrust and betrayal; a new election sees stronger gains by the ultra-nationalists. “Europe” becomes a remoter, more hostile place. The neighbours become nervous.

At this writing, all we have is the numbers and the public statements, and some hope that at least the way to the high road is potentially open

International reaction

Within hours of the polls closing, it became clear that while the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party had the biggest share of the vote, other parties should be able to combine their shares to form a government. Were such a “pro-Western government” to be formed, it would have many encouraging words to draw on.

Ahead of the election, European Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said that a victory by democratic forces would open the way for Serbia to gain candidate EU member status. Sweden made encouraging noises. So did Greece, as did Austria, reminding that support was conditional on Serbia fulfilling “already known conditions”. Those who turned out at the final election rally of Tadic's Democratic Party included former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Bulgarian prime minister Sergei Stanishev and Macedonian prime minister Nikola Gruevski, who said that Serbia's place was in Europe. Interviewed by the Voice of America, assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs Daniel Fried said: “We would like to see a Serbia that chooses Europe...the Serbian people deserve a future in Europe no less than any other people in Europe”. Fried warned against the choice of nationalism: “Nationalism in that part of the world is like cheap alcohol. First it makes you drunk, then it makes you blind, then it kills you”.

After the provisional results emerged, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana said that democratic forces had won. “I hope very much that there will be a formation of a speedy government that will be in line with the EU,” Solana said. German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said that the result was “a sound basis for creating the kind of government that will lead Serbia towards the EU”.

The US ambassador in Belgrade, Michael Polt, said that Serbians had spoken out in favour of a secure, prosperous future inside the Euro-Atlantic community.

Domestic reaction

Among the parties expected to form the coalition, official denials followed media reports that tentative negotiations were already taking place. Such negotiations would begin only after results were officially announced, which was due to happen by midnight on January 25.

Bozhidar Delic, the prime minister candidate of Tadic's Democratic Party, said that he expected that Tadic would hand him the mandate to attempt to form a government. Current prime minister Vojislav Kostunica, of the Democratic Party of Serbia (distinct from the party led by Tadic) said that it was up to president Tadic to decide on to whom to hand a mandate.  G17 Plus leader Mladan Dinkic, whose party placed third, let it be known he thought it best that his party was included in a coalition, which would then have at least 132 seats in the 250-seat parliament.

Tomislav Nikolic, who is acting leader of the Serb Radical Party in the stead of Vojislav Seselj, currently c/o The Hague, welcomed the party's “victory” but conceded that it did not expect to be handed a mandate to attempt to form a government.

Belgrade on the line

In conversation by telephone on January 23, a senior political journalist in Belgrade put it this way: “Everyone is celebrating, the Radicals, along with everyone else, having won the election. But so far nothing has really happened and we don't know what really is going to happen. Will Tadic and Kostunica be able to get past their differences? I don't know. If we have to have elections again in three months, I won't be surprised. Perhaps, neither will a lot of other people here”.

The Russian factor

The only thing that Moscow agreed with Western powers about the January 21 elections in Serbia was that they were free and fair.

The Kremlin has been pursuing, consistently and ostentatiously, a hard line about the future of Kosovo. In a telephone conversation with Kostunica on January 15, and in a meeting soon afterwards with German chancellor Angela Merkel, Russian president Vladimir Putin said that Russia would not support any proposal by Ahtisaari that would mean independence for Kosovo. The Kremlin has strongly backed, in effect, the slogan pushed by Kostunica and plentifully daubed on the walls of Belgrade: “Ne Damo Kosovo” (We Won't Give Up Kosovo). Russia has repeated on several occasions that it will use its security council veto against independence for Kosovo. Against this advantage held by Russia, it is not even a question of a battle of wills about the future of Kosovo, and by extension Serbia and the region. It is more likely to be a test of diplomacy and negotiating skills, and in the meantime, a time of Serbians having to await which road will be opened for them.