Two days of discussions in the British capital involving the Troika of international mediators appear to have paved the way for the opening of high-level, face-to-face negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina at the end of September.

But diplomatic sources warn that a solution acceptable to both sides remains as elusive as ever.

The latest round of talks on the UN-administered entity’s future has provided an insight into the negotiating tactics of Kosovo’s independence-seeking Albanian leadership and Serbia’s diplomacy that is fighting a rearguard battle to halt any return to the option of “supervised independence”, as recommended by the previous mediator, UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari.

Meanwhile, the Troika ambassadors, Wolfgang Ischinger for the EU, Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko for Russia and Frank Wisner for the US, have been seeking to maintain a semblance of unity against a background of divisions between the Kremlin and the West. That disagreement resulted in Russia’s refusal to endorse the Western-backed Ahtisaari plan at the UN Security Council in July.

The Security Council fiasco prompted the six-nation Contact Group, which brings together Russia and the main Western powers, to set up the Troika which kicked off its first simultaneous – but separate – round of talks with the two sides in Vienna at the end of August.

The Belgrade and Pristina delegations arrived in London bearing not only very different messages but also contrasting presentational packages.

“In Vienna, Belgrade came up with a slick PowerPoint presentation, but not much new has been added now,” says a diplomat from an EU country, who is close to the talks. “This time Kosovo produced some fairly detailed proposals that amount to a draft treaty – all looking very professional.”

The Serbian government’s offer of extensive autonomy, but not independence, is seen by observers as largely a restatement of its policy over the past year. It would give Kosovo self-rule, without interference from Belgrade, in most areas of government, but not the attributes of a sovereign state with a seat at the UN.

Interestingly for many observers, Serbia’s public diplomacy has been focusing in practice not so much on Kosovo’s future, let alone on the fate of its small Serb minority, but on the wider implications of the decision to be made. One of these is the broader geo-strategic impact of an imposed solution, along the lines of Ahtisaari’s blueprint, which Belgrade would regard as the “amputation” of part of its territory. It was a point foreign minister Vuk Jeremic made forcefully in a lecture on Tuesday at Britain’s oldest foreign policy think tank, Chatham House.

“Imposing the independence of Kosovo is nothing else than the forcible partitioning of Serbia... how could such a precedent not affect the rest of the Balkans?” Jeremic asked.

Serbian officials have argued that Kosovo’s independence, whether imposed by mediators or declared unilaterally, could trigger or re-ignite separatist conflicts across the region, involving other ethnic Albanian communities in Macedonia and Serbia’s own Presevo valley as well as Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It remains a potent warning to EU countries with ethnic minorities or separatist groups of their own, such as Romania and Slovakia – and further away, Spain.

Moscow has repeatedly advanced a similar argument, declaring that any solution to Kosovo should set the pattern for other frozen conflicts involving pro-Russian break-away regions in the former Soviet republics. It was precisely to scotch such wholesale redrawing of maps that Western members of the Contact Group have insisted on Kosovo being an exception. With its unique status as a virtual UN protectorate and its own specific history, they argue Kosovo should be treated sui generis.

Belgrade’s other public relations argument is to repeat its warning that Kosovo’s independence could lead to dramatic changes on Serbia’s political stage. These would involve more hardline nationalist parties taking the place of the current, mostly pro-European coalition government. In London Jeremic held out the prospect of Serbia “retreating into self-imposed isolation on the basis that seclusion is better than humiliation”.

Pragmatic, Westward-looking forces in Serbia appear to be keen to use the nationalist bogeyman to signal to Brussels that for many Serbs the idea of holding on to the phantom of Kosovo may prove more attractive than grasping the chance of a future in Europe.

“If the EU recognises Kosovo’s independence,” a senior Serb official said in London, “the people of Serbia will almost certainly not accept that... and a change of government could come about through the democratic choice of the people. This would not be good for Serbia, the western Balkans or the EU – but it’s likely to happen.”

While the Serbian side indulges in graphic portrayals of the prospect of disunity over Europe at home, Kosovo Albanian leaders have been busy presenting a united front. In fact, members of their Unity Team of negotiators, which brings together president Fatmir Sejdiu and prime minister Agim Ceku with other top leaders, have been differing over what action to take, if the current phase of talks, which the West wants to be concluded by December 10, ends in failure.

Ceku and Kosovo’s unofficial “foreign minister”, Veton Surroi, have been calling for a speedy timetable involving Kosovo declaring its independence if the talks do not bear fruit. Sejdiu and other politicians have been counselling caution and insisting on close co-ordination of any moves with Kosovo’s Western partners.

Meanwhile, in London Ceku reiterated the Kosovar Albanian stance that the issue of sovereignty is not negotiable. “We have made it very clear once again that independence is a done deal. There is no stability in the region without the independence of Kosovo.”

The Unity Team submitted to the Troika a full-length draft treaty with Serbia. It provides the foundations for a comprehensive network of relations in the areas of diplomacy, security, trade and humanitarian issues.

Since the treaty assumes the form of a basic document regulating relations between two independent states, it is, by its very nature, unacceptable to Serbia, which continues to regard Kosovo as an integral part of its own territory. So what purpose does it serve? Surroi set out to put it in a constructive light, in remarks to Balkan Insight: “What we are saying is that this (independence) is the direction in which we are heading. We can either say that we ignore each other, or that we are prepared to co-operate.”

Given the seemingly unbridgeable gap between the two sides, the Troika is trying to focus on specific areas where progress can possibly be made, such as the establishment or reactivation of joint bodies to deal with trade and other economic relations, refugee returns and the dialogue on missing persons. Ischinger has repeatedly said that at this stage the Troika wants to set aside the “label issue” – the independence versus autonomy dilemma.

The Troika’s approach is similar to the methods Ahtisaari adopted during his mediation effort when much of the time was spent on trying to bring the two sides to agree on technical issues, such as the devolution of powers to local authorities in Kosovo and the protection of Serb Orthodox Church heritage. It was only after Belgrade and Pristina failed to agree that Ahtisaari proposed a status amounting to supervised independence.

“The Troika is trying to home in on areas of overlap. If some agreement can be found on these, then they can be built on, and that’s a good thing,” according to a Western diplomat close to the talks.

Yet few expect that even this softly-softly approach will produce anything close to an agreement, let alone by December 10, the Western-backed informal deadline Russia has repeatedly rejected.

There is renewed interest in alternative options, such as Kosovo’s partition that would involve its Serb-controlled north being formally united with Serbia proper, while the rest of Kosovo becomes independent. Although partition was once ruled out by the Contact Group, more recently there have been hints that it could be acceptable as part of a settlement, as long as it was agreed by both sides.

Belgrade is believed to favour this solution as part of a compromise, and a senior Serbian official visiting London came close to implying possible support for it: “The Serbian government is against the partitioning of Serbia, regardless of wherever the line may be drawn. But we cannot overemphasise the importance of finding a compromise which is more important than any imposed solution.”

For the deal to work, it would have to be accepted by the Kosovo Albanians, but Surroi says “we are against partition under any conditions”.

For now, the Troika will be turning its efforts to trying to establish some kind of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. After Vienna and London, next week the Kosovo diplomatic “road show” moves to New York where Contact Group foreign ministers are expected on September 27 to issue a call for face-to-face talks. These – the first in the current phase of negotiations – would then take place the following day.

As the talks continue, the Troika’s difficulties are expected to multiply. There are no signs at present that the Russia and the West are prepared to strike a bargain if Belgrade and Pristina fail to agree. “Frankly, given Russia’s position in July,” a Western diplomat says, “after all the concessions we made, it’s unlikely Moscow would endorse a deal.”

Many officials in the Contact Group countries share this sense of pessimism and believe time is running out before Kosovo Albanians lose their patience and declare independence unilaterally. But for now they see their task as keeping the diplomatic process on track.

Gabriel Partos is Editor of Balkan Insight, BIRN’s online publication. www.birn.eu.com