Old habits, local preoccupations and poor capacity leave countries with no foreign policy beyond joining the EU and Nato, ANNA MCTAGGART writes from Belgrade.

The phrase “international community” has specific connotations in the Western Balkans. It conjures up states that determine the region’s boundaries, design constitutions and police peace agreements.

It also conjures up the mass of organisations that fill out these agreements with aid and development programmes and introduce a new way of conducting matters in politics and economics.

What does not occur to most people in the region is that their countries might one day be part of that community.

Although the turmoil of the 1990s, which saw the world focus on Balkan conflicts, may be fading, the habits that accompany being the “object” of international policy die hard.

Even now, as the world talks of international terrorism, nuclear threats, energy supply politics and alarming climate change, this corner of Europe remains focused on its immediate issues and has neglected to line up with strategic partners abroad on matters of wider concern.

Beyond the overriding goals of Euro-Atlantic integration, the countries of South East Europe appear slow to realise the importance and potential of foreign policy.

A feeling that they are irrelevant combined with introspection and nationalism means progress towards the EU and Nato is their only real foreign policy.

At the same time, a range of problems has limited Balkan countries from articulating and promoting their positions on the international scene.

The political problems range from a lack of domestic consensus on broad goals, cadre shifts from election to election and nepotism in recruitment. Government-wide consensuses and co-ordination on external dealings are also hard to come by.

Analysts agree that the countries in the region need to further their Euro-Atlantic goals by proving themselves more responsible, consistent and useful on the international stage, thus ridding themselves of their images as troublemakers.

They concur that regional co-operation is the only way to make real progress and that a firmer commitment to this is needed at the highest political level if the region is to start realising its potential.

A SIDELINED REGION
Beyond the ranks of the conspiracy theorists, few people in the Western Balkans believe the region figures in international affairs as much more than an inconvenience.

The Cold War era, when Yugoslavia enjoyed a strategic, high profile role between the big powers, ended long ago with the descent in the 1990s into self-destructive violence and poverty. Since then, Yugoslavia’s small successor states have been passive recipients of the policies articulated elsewhere.

With the UN now mulling the final status of Kosovo, there are hopes that a resolution of this running sore may end two decades of instability and mark the start of the region’s real recovery and rehabilitation.

EU and Nato integration is seen as both the framework for this rehabilitation and the central goal, though each country in the region is at a different stage on that road.

While they are making overall progress towards membership of these organisations, they are far from realising their role as pro-active members of the international community.

A cursory glance at any government’s foreign policy strategy suggests EU and Nato membership are their only real foreign concerns; they leave others to worry about broader global dilemmas on security, energy, the environment and human rights.

Although some countries are starting to contribute more internationally, by signing up to treaties, conventions and forums, and by sending troops on other international missions, they are still best known as the ground on which the international community has tested its policies.

A WIDER VISION HELPS
Bearing in mind the problems these countries face, it may be premature to expect them to become engaged in issues beyond their own political and economic transition.

As Balkan analyst Tim Judah points out: “They have such problems to deal with at home, so they think: what’s the point in having an opinion on these issues?”

But Christopher Alden, an expert on international relations from the London School of Economics, says this is short-sighted. “Small states should find a reason in most issues for taking a stance; most after all involve principles of sovereignty, which is of central importance to the Western Balkans, and something they should have a position on.

“And while globalisation has levelled the playing field somewhat when it comes to trade, diplomacy can still help in winning important projects and deals.”

When it comes to balancing the interests of the EU, Nato and powerful states such as the US or Russia, Alden maintains that “astute actors can balance these and play one against the other”.

Those working for the region’s development also believe broader international engagement is advisable. Ivan Vejvoda, director of the Balkan Trust for Democracy, says Balkan states “need to get involved, not from a naive belief that we are going to solve international problems like Darfur or climate change, but to educate [people) about the importance of international engagement”.

Sonja Licht, of the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence, agrees. “There is a lack of awareness among our political leaders as to the value of international engagement in a globalised world,” she said. “There is not only a lack of knowledge about the world and how it operates but also a lack of awareness of that ignorance.”

Licht detects a “parochial syndrome”, which she attributes to the appalling problems afflicting the region in recent years. “There have been so many crises that it’s almost too much for people to engage with the rest of the world,” she said.

Traditions of non-alignment and isolation mean active engagement on the international scene is only seen as necessary when immediate interests are at stake.

As Milica Djilas, an EU expert at Belgrade University, puts it, “These small states are yet to make the transition to attracting international attention other than as troublemakers.”

However, the realisation is taking hold in some official quarters that a more active engagement on a wider range of issues can further their own countries’ priorities and win the support of like-minded partners.

Emil Kirjas, a former Macedonian foreign ministry official now studying geopolitics in London, is one of those arguing for such a change.

“Balkan countries don’t comprehend that in diplomacy and international affairs, relations are based on networking with friends with whom you share values,” he said. “The less visible you are, the less friends you will have. Countries don’t want to ally with anyone who is silent.”

As Vejvoda points out, part of the process of joining the EU involves aligning oneself with its foreign, security and defence policies.

“Balkan countries need to show they are anchored in the EU and Nato, but espousing their values also means taking a position on wider international issues,” he said.

When it comes to the EU, putting one’s cards on the table is important, both to convince the bloc of a state’s maturity, and because aspiring members will one day have to participate themselves in the formation of common European foreign policies.

According to Eugeniusz Smolar, president of the Institute for International Relations in Warsaw, responsible engagement is a must.

“The EU’s foreign and security policy is still not developed enough, which means there are debates, quarrels and compromise within the EU,” he said.

The earlier that aspiring members start, the better, as the experience of all Central and Eastern European states that joined the EU in recent years shows.

“We are only starting to learn how to really promote our interests and priorities within the EU,” said Ljubos Vesely of the Association for International Affairs in Prague. “In the Czech Republic, increasing foreign policy capacity is a constant work in progress.”

DO THEY HAVE THE CAPACITY?
Even with the best will in the world, Western Balkan states face formidable domestic obstacles before they can engage more fully in international affairs.

When it comes to making foreign policy, a clear idea of basic values is necessary. Recalling the Polish experience in the early 1990s, Smolar said, “We developed a very clear idea and firm consensus about what we wanted, allowing us to set the EU and Nato enlargement agenda... Everyone spoke with one voice.”

This harmonised outlook is not replicated throughout the Balkans. Serbia’s declared goals of EU and Nato integration, for example, clash with its attempts to hold onto Kosovo and its failure to fully co-operate with the international war crimes tribunal for former Yugoslavia.

Danijel Sunter, head of the Euro-Atlantic Initiative in Serbia, says Serbia is faced with a national identity crisis. “There is a desire to become part of the Euro-Atlantic community, but an irresponsible political elite and its internal power struggles, combined with unresolved wartime legacies, make this more difficult.”

In most countries in the region, volatile politics undermine the chances of forming and co-ordinating consistent policies. Changes to borders also hold up matters. Following Montenegro’s exit from the state union with Serbia in May 2006, for example, Serbia has still not appointed many ambassadors to key countries or resolved the status of the foreign ministry.

Sunter says Serbia’s Nato integration provides another illustration of this predicament. “Recently, military co-operation with Nato has been one of the most active parts of Serbian international relations, making defence reform a real success story,” he said. “But while the ministry of defence and army are involved, other relevant institutions are passive, still used as political tools as they await reform.”
Croatia is more stable and its EU membership negotiations are underway. But it, too, has problems. Official policy on EU integration implies trade liberalisation and openness to foreign direct investment. But the dictates of domestic populist politics mean Zagreb often sends conflicting messages.

Goran Saravanja, economist analyst at UniCredit MIB in Zagreb, says Croatia’s mixed messages on trade liberalisation run counter to its declared policy of EU integration. “This is ...short-term populism rather than coherent policy,” he noted.

Part of the problem in the region is structural and systemic. The successor states to Yugoslavia face a huge task in developing modern, efficient state systems that can make and implement policies. Politicisation, nepotism and corruption hold back the formation of a professional cadre.

Licht says the region’s countries need to be “building a state and society based on merit...but our political class is showing day by day that if can’t initiate moves towards these aims”.

The professionalisation of officialdom needs to be dealt with by introducing a fair way of making appointments, and by establishing proper training and career incentives.

In Croatia, such reforms are in progress. But Saravanja says they have a long way to go: “There are tens of thousands of public servants without adequate skills.” At the heart of the problem, he adds, is that “promotion often doesn’t depend on performance”.

Saravanja concludes: “In the region in general, a proper pay structure and career path needs to be developed in the public sector, while training and education need to be changed, with more focus on critical thinking, policy-making, fostering debate and the value of pluralism.”

While resources to implement such sweeping changes are scarce, the need for policy research is pressing as countries start to take up international duties.

Macedonia is set to chair of the general assembly of the UN later this year. But Kirjas fears little preparation is being made. “How can we chair discussions on Darfur when no one in Macedonia really knows what is going on there?” he asked. “This is a golden opportunity for Macedonia to promote itself internationally but I worry we won’t exploit it.”

Kirjas says training is now underway with EU and US assistance, “but the remnants of the more senior generations trained during the era of Yugoslavia’s non-alignment are still there”.

Licht believes international donors could do more to support policy institutes and think tanks but, ultimately, political will and leadership will make the difference.

“Serbia is now to chair the Council of Europe, and thanks to the visionary approach of state and non-governmental groups, a council has been prepared to design Serbia’s chairmanship, drawing on sectors such as parliament, foreign ministry, judiciary, civil society and local municipalities,” she said

Licht hopes this may set a new standard for how members of the Council of Europe can prepare for chairmanship.

To really improve the international image of Balkan countries, wider investment is also needed in the diplomatic service. As Alden points out: “Diplomacy is costly and small countries can’t afford to set up embassies everywhere. They need to define their economic and security interests and then decide on their priorities.”

But the rationality and quality of diplomatic representations of Balkan countries is still open to question. Serbia again provides an example. As Judah noted, “While Serbia is seeking to lobby the UN over Kosovo, it lacks ambassadors in key member states of the security council.”

Judah believes the Western Balkans in general lack awareness of the potential to exploit their interests. “While many may bemoan [EU) enlargement fatigue, the fact is that many important people are well-disposed towards the Balkans, including the likes of [Swedish foreign minister) Carl Bildt and [Italian interior minister) Giuliano Amato,” he said. “But while they have shown their commitment to the progress of the region, this could be put to far better use by the countries concerned.”

Kirjas agrees. Although Macedonia impressed the international community by averting an open conflict with its Albanian minority in 2001, it has not turned the experience to its advantage.

“Macedonia has lost out quite a lot,” he said. “It gained so many friends by showing wisdom and restraint [in 2001) but hasn’t exploited that to further its goals. It’s the foreigners who promote Macedonia’s role in the region, rather than we ourselves.”

Croatia has been able to use bilateral alliances to further its interests, with Germany and Austria strongly supporting its EU candidacy bid. But it has been less successful in managing more “difficult” bilateral relationships with Slovenia and Italy.

Saravanja believes Croatia needs to “make every effort to take the politics out of this kind of exchange. In a few years, it will be in the EU and expected to take part in resolving such issues. It needs to build credibility in the interim.”

FINDING THE RIGHT NICHE
To meet these challenges, analysts and officials agree that leadership is the key. A recent study also shows how, with the right leadership, smaller countries can create a significant role for themselves on the international stage.

Recent research by the Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies on decision-making within the European Council highlighted the difference that can be made by charismatic heads of state or government.

The experience of the Czech Republic bears this out. As Vesely explains, this country “had the huge advantage of having Vaclav Havel as president to lead it through the transition, as the West saw him as the symbol of democratic change throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

“He [Havel) had a keen understanding of the world and the importance of engaging in it... This gave us visibility and earned us respect.”

Strong leaders of small countries can make strategic alliances, helping to “sell” their country better and re-orientate it as a credible partner, said Alden.

“A classic approach for small states is to develop an area expertise, or niche diplomacy. This can elevate its standing to that that of a much bigger player,” he said.

Norway is a commonly cited example of this, having carved out a role as an advocate of peace and international law, and making little attempt to influence other areas.

Kirjas believes Macedonia could develop a niche in the field of peacefully diffusing inter-ethnic problems. “We should be presenting ourselves as a model for the region, for any situation in which minorities need to be integrated peacefully into society,” he said.

Judah sees similar potential in Bosnia and Herzegovina. “It could take advantage of its moderate Muslim tradition, bridging the gap between the EU, Nato and the Muslim world.” However, he added, “It is far from realising that potential.”

Analysts agree that regional co-operation offers the best hope for improving the region’s international standing. According to Djilas: “These countries stand a much greater chance of being a relevant factor for the EU and internationally if they can develop a South East European dimension but they have yet to learn how to co-operate to further the profile and interests of the region.

“Despite their experiences with war crimes justice, for example, they have as yet failed to come up with a common position on the International Criminal Court.”

Regional coordination is not only a precondition for EU and Nato, and beneficial when it comes to solving local problems; it also offers countries in the region the chance to have more weight in the international arena.

“There are a range of issues that merit a regional position, including visa regime, organised crime and aspects of European integration such as pre-accession funding and Turkish EU membership,” said Djilas.

Regional co-operation has already forced greater commitments from the EU, most notably the commitment to a membership perspective for the Western Balkans made at Thessaloniki in 2003.

This followed the publication of a joint letter in the International Herald Tribune from the region’s leaders.

But as Djilas points out, a similar level of joint political activism has not been seen since. “It is becoming more difficult to work as a group to lobby for interests, as progress becomes so varied,” she said.

In contrast, regional co-operation on the technical level is better than ever.

“There is a huge amount of co-operation between technocrats around the region,” said Judah. “Macedonia for example finished its EU questionnaire in record time because it could take Croatia’s earlier answers as an example.”

The same goes for Nato, according to Sunter. “Croatian and Serbian officers are free to create better co-operation than their equivalent politicians,” he said.

“Thanks to Nato membership becoming a common goal in the region, we have the amazing situation that all defence structures have intensive co-operation. Bearing in mind that many of these countries were only recently at war, this is very promising.”

This level of co-operation is being achieved partly because defence reforms are conducted free of the influence of daily politics. “It’s not seen as an area that politicians can use to profit their power struggles,” noted Sunter.

For a number of reasons, this co-operation is not easily translatable to the political level.

Djilas says countries actually fear being seen to cooperate too closely. “There is a fear of being treated as a group because of [EU) enlargement fatigue,” she said.

“For this reason, it is important that regional co-operation isn’t portrayed as a consolation prize.”

While the recent agreement to set up a free trade area in the region has been hailed as proof that regional co-operation is working, the CEFTA talks were nevertheless plagued by the resistance of several countries to integration per se.

Vejvoda is, nevertheless, optimistic. “This [the CEFTA process) was like a ‘coming-of-age’ for these younger European democracies,” he said. “They are finding it hard to relinquish their hard-won autonomy but they are aware that they are small and weak alone.”

“CEFTA represents progress,” he added, after “the legacy of communism and the chaos of the 1990s”.

Whether the Balkan countries can cast off their negative image as a security threat, and promote their common interests more convincingly remains to be seen.

“If we could become each other’s champions, speaking more with a joint voice, this would demonstrate European values to the EU and maybe enable faster integration into the EU,” said Vejvoda.

Alden puts it another way: “As with the lottery, you don’t win if you don’t buy a ticket. If countries don’t occupy a seat and articulate a position, then they are guaranteed to have no influence at all.”

Anna McTaggart is a BIRN editor and manager of the Balkan Fellowship for Journalistic Excellence. Balkan Insight is BIRN’s online publication. www.birn.eu.com