The aftermath of recent elections posed a question: whether getting into an enduring impasse was contagious. In the case of presidential elections in Serbia, the answer might be yes; the February 3 run-off gave only this answer. It did not seem to resolve to the pivotal question of whether the public preferred the European Union’s moderate approach on Kosovo (exemplified by incumbent president Boris Tadic) or the more radical, pro-Russia-oriented approach on the Serbian breakaway province (taken by the hard-line nationalist Tomislav Nikolic) or was non-committal to either.

Non-involvement was not the core of the problem. The society was more politicised than ever, as a turnout of 67 per cent showed. This was similar to the number that took part in the 2000 elections that ousted the then-president Slobodan Milosevic. What is more, it exposed a wider social divide than ever. Developments in the days after showed this rift had inflamed a new political crisis many commentators believed could lead to the collapse of the government and a call for new elections.
With the spread of dissension proliferating with unseen speed, only time will show whether it can be tamed.

Wider than ever
On February 3, West-leaning president Tadic snatched victory, by a narrow margin – 50.7 to 47 per cent, against the hard-line nationalist Tomislav Nikolic. Analysts pointed to the margin. While in 2004 the difference between the same two candidates was nine percentage points, this time it dwindled to just under four. The narrowing pointed to signs of awakening nationalism, which would have even been more pronounced had the European Union stopped itself from starting talks on visa relaxation with Serbia days before the run-off. The talks, as part of an EU promise to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement – the first step toward EU pre-entry talks – were interpreted as a tap on the back for Tadic by the EU, in a tight race that saw Nikolic with a narrow lead after the first round.

Once the sweetener was offered, however, on February 4 the EU turned to an issue that surely tastes sour to Serbian constituency’s palette, and to the political elite that represents it. The EU foreign ministers voted on the dispatch of an 1800-strong civil and administrative mission to Kosovo, an issue that was to no one’s satisfaction in Serbia.

The latest events showed that the moves of key international players, with regard to Kosovo and Serbia, shaped the attitudes in a society that has become so Kosovo-sensitive that any external action in this regard can have a tidal effect. It is clear that the discord in the population rests not over Kosovo and the EU, the cornerstones of the presidential campaign. Three out of four Serbians want EU membership and all want Kosovo remain within the Serbian boundaries. Rather, it rests on which institution, and how, protects and respects national interests.

The EU performed neat diplomacy in the days leading up to the run-off and Tadic earned his second presidential mandate. However, precisely for the reasons above his re-election did not bring a sigh of relief about easing the tension over potential violence on Kosovo’s independence. On the contrary, the situation has been exacerbated for those same reasons to the extent that Tadic and prime minister Vojislav Kostunica are at loggerheads.

Two days after Tadic was re-elected, Serbia was again awash with potential election fever. Rumours that Serbia might hold general elections in May were based on the differences between Tadic’s and Kostunica’s interpretations of the “no Kosovo secession” and “EU future” slogans. On February 5, the prime minister drew a definitive line between Serbia’s EU ambitions and Kosovo’s independence. Namely, he opposed a trade-off between a document rubber-stamping Serbia’s EU course for an implicit Serbian agreement to a separate Kosovo.

This statement put the country and the political elite from one nationalism-to-pragmatism test to another.

Just the start?
Kostunica said that the concurrent EU agreement to sign an Association and Stabilisation Agreement with Serbia on February 7 intended to muffle the impact of EU actions in the Serbian breakaway province, which Kostunica has previously interpreted as a “threat to territorial integrity”.

“The EU’s proposal to sign a political agreement with Serbia, while at the same time sending a mission to break apart our state is a deception aimed at getting Serbia effectively to sign its agreement to Kosovo’s independence,” Kostunica was quoted by international media as saying. “With this decision, the EU has directly threatened sovereignty, territorial integrity and the constitutional order of Serbia,” Kostunica said.

Furthermore, he summoned a special parliament session to consider the agreement.

It was not immediately clear whether Serbia’s agreement to sign the document would come from an approbation from the government or through a majority vote in parliament.

How deep is the rift?
However, what became immediately clear was that the statement engendered a fast-developing schism within the government. Some international commentators even saw the EU accord, in combination with Kosovo, as a discord with the potential to rip the shaky governmental coalition apart.

Serbian infrastructure minister Velimir Ilic admitted in an interview with Serbian Press daily that the “government is in a deep crisis”.

“I fear it might fall this month because of Kosovo and the signing of the accord with the EU,” he said. If Kosovo went ahead and declared independence this month, Serbia might well find itself heading for snap elections already in May, Ilic said.

Meanwhile, former US ambassador to Serbia William Montgomery was quoted by Reuters as saying that the probability that the government would disintegrate “is not simply rhetoric.”

Kostunica “seemed determined to force the EU to choose between its plans for Kosovo and its relationship with Serbia,” said Montgomerry in a weekly column, quoted by Reuters.

It was hard to see how the impasse can end “any other way than in a breakdown in the ruling coalition,” he said.

The 25-minister cabinet comprises seven ministers from Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the remainder comes with Tadic’s Democratic Party (DS) and their liberal ally G17+.

This means that Tadic’s party can block any of Kostunica’s decisions within government and lead to a deadlock within the nine-month-old coalition.

DS and G17+ have long backed the rubber-stamping of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Commentators have predicted that if the government does not reach consensus on the issue this might  cause the collapse of the coalition.

The grounds for such an outcome stems from the illicit inter-personal alienation between Tadic and Kostunica, which became particularly visible to observers in the days up to the run-off. Then Kostunica did not overtly back either of the candidates yet illicitly supported pro-Russia Nikolic through the signing of the sweeping Serbia-Russia energy accord. To recall, it granted Russia control over Serbia’s oil and gas company NIS, authorised the construction of an underground storage facility and provided for a fork in the future South Stream gas pipeline project to Serbia.

Kosovo
It is worth mentioning that a day after Tadic was re-elected as president, the Kosovo prime minister Hashim Thaci announced that Kosovo was now ready to declare independence, with the backing of the West.

Though secession declarations have been replete since the turn of the year, things have grown increasingly complicated and a number of media have wound back the degree of certainty on Kosovo’s independence. If only for the fact that the number of countries overtly declaring they would not recognise Kosovo’s independence has grown with the addition of Cyprus and Romania.

Meanwhile, the hard-core opponent to Kosovo’s secession, Russia, had yet to release an official statement on Tadic’s election at a premier or presidential level. In regard to Kosovo, an official from Russia’s upper house reiterated on February 4 his country’s position that the Kosovo status should be resolved within the UN Security Council. Meanwhile, Serbian foreign minister Vuk Jeremic said his country regarded Russia as its main economic partner and political ally. So did he say about the EU.

The East-West lurk of Serbia seem to continue. It appears that the presidential election, instead of soothing the political situation, has only further exacerbated ongoing problems. As if replicating the embattled impasse fate of its historical heartland Kosovo, Serbia looks growingly on course to an impasse of its own. With the rift in society being wider than ever and politicians growingly averse to a consensus, even snap elections do not seem a solution. A potential rapprochement between the key international players on Kosovo – Russia, the UN and the EU – might help tame Kosovo’s influence on Serbia.