A number of conclusions may be drawn from the Russian-Georgian conflict. Among them is that a key factor in any decision by Nato and the Western allies of long standing will be considerations of energy security.
It is not just that the military might that Moscow can summon is awesome enough to deter any response from Washington, Nato and the European Union other than disapproving soundbites. Notwithstanding all the talk in recent years about finding alternatives to being energy-dependent on Russia, many countries in the immediate region of its borders and several countries beyond find themselves in just that position.
There is a morbid absurdity in the confirmation from the White House that the US would not intervene militarily to back up the Saakashvili administration in Tbilisi. It would have seemed perfectly obvious that there would be no such intervention, and the fact that Saakashvili fell into a well-prepared trap in his confrontation with Moscow means that he has verged on recklessly endangering the integrity of the state of which he has stewardship.
The Russian media, and – less publicly – no doubt the Kremlin too – have been able to scoff at the ineffectual gathering that was the summit of Nato foreign ministers. The summit produced little more than complaint that Moscow’s response to the South Ossetia crisis was “disproportionate”, to say that there could not be “business as usual” with Russia, and Nato decided to improve communication and co-ordination with Tbilisi, along with a signal that Nato may be prepared to step up the process of bringing Georgia into its fold. Now that it is clear that Moscow may act with impunity in what it sees as its sphere of influence, it is not certain how much it will really mean for the security of Georgia to be part of that fold. Currently, while it may not formally be a member of Nato, Georgia and the military alliance have been involved in a long process of mutual cultivation, and it was clear on whose side Georgia has been. The future is now less clear, if the outcome of the South Ossetia crisis fulfils Moscow’s aspirations to topple Saakashvili from office.
What is clear about the future is that the game is still afoot. The US and Poland have signed a defence deal that has irked Moscow, with a top general saying that the Warsaw government “will not go unpunished” for the deal. It is unclear what the current US administration and the future White House will do, or be prepared to do, if Moscow moves against Warsaw through economic or other “punitive” measures. Ukraine, which has stepped firmly into the pro-Georgia camp, should understand that there are strict limits to how much help it will get in a serious confrontation.
What of Bulgaria, which generally has good relations with all parties, barring details such as siding, albeit discreetly, with the US and not Russia on the Kosovo issue? Sofia has not cancelled the Year of Russia in Bulgaria and would not consider doing so. Not a word has been spoken officially against Moscow, and in engagements with Georgia, Bulgaria has come out with routine verbiage about supporting Georgia’s integrity and sovereignty. At the Nato meeting, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin did go so far as to raise the issue of expanding Nato’s Mediterranean patrols into the Black Sea, but also – reportedly – reminded his colleagues of the need to maintain energy infrastructure security. Considering the performance of other countries that some may have expected to give stronger backing to Georgia, it would be unfair to single out Bulgaria for criticism. The game is realpolitik, the stakes are built on the flow of energy to keep economies alive, and – for the foreseeable future – Russia is winning.
