A study by the Sofia-based Centre for Liberal Strategies found that various institutions have different definitions in dealing with organised crime. This is their account of the study.
The project Task Force on Organised Crime in Bulgaria explored three institutional discourses on organised crime: in the police, in the prosecutorial office, and in the courts. On the basis of more than 30 semi-structured interviews with representatives of these institutions, we have attempted to present their understanding of the nature of organised crime in Bulgaria and the strategy which the state should adopt in fighting it. Our conclusions should be understood as generalisations: there could be officials in all three institutions which disagree with our interpretation. Yet, we are convinced that we have captured important voices and views that need to be taken into account in discussions of the institutional responses to organised crime in the country.
These institutional responses should be interpreted against a background of specific public expectations for institutional reactions (for instance, studies show that the public expects more convictions of members of organised criminal networks); there is also increasing pressure from international partners (such as the EU) for more efficient and decisive action against organised crime and crime in general.
Our main finding is that there are important differences in the way representatives of the different institutions construe their own response to organised crime, in terms of strategy, indicators of success or failure, and the definition of main obstacles.
• The police understand organised crime as a network phenomenon and have adopted a strategy of undermining the economic base of the organised criminal groups. For the prosecutors, it is almost impossible to substantiate organised crime charges in court, and because of that their preferred strategy is to indict suspected members of organised groups for “ordinary” crimes. The courts, on their part, have almost no jurisprudence on organised criminal groups. Having in mind these differences, it is possible to conclude that the institutional responses of the police on the one hand, and the prosecutors and the courts on the other, differ in important ways: the former attempt to address networks, the latter address mainly individual crimes.
• The three institutions also define success in the fight against organised crime differently. Firstly, there are no common patterns of reporting of cases. Secondly, while the police are mainly interested in the so-called “realisations” - the capture of members of organised groups and the disruption of their activities (such as drug channels), the prosecutors are interested in successful convictions. Since it is difficult to obtain convictions on organised crime charges, the prosecutors work to obtain convictions of individuals, public servants and even politicians reputed to have connections with organised crime groups. Courts, on their own part, refrain from measuring success in terms of number of convictions; yet, sometimes judges do succumb to public pressure and become reluctant to acquit individuals in cases seen by the public as organised crime cases. This refusal to acquit sometimes leads to significant procedural delays and complications, which further undermines citizens’ confidence in the judicial system in general.
• Although virtually all of our respondents recognised the importance of the inter-institutional cooperation in the fight against organised crime, each of them saw not their own institution, but their partners as a main source of obstacles in the co-operative effort. Commonly, the police accuse the courts, the courts - the prosecutors, and the prosecutors - mainly the police and sometimes the courts. Not surprisingly, this leads to different understandings of the need for future institutional reforms.
On the basis of this analysis of institutional voices, the following four problems are offered for public discussion:
• The public expects a tough institutional response to organised crime understood as a network phenomenon. At present, the institutions in the country, and the judicial system in particular, deal successfully mainly with individual crimes. This gap between public expectations and institutional response needs to be analysed carefully, because it is a source of public distrust in institutions.
• As the relationships between some key institutions in the fight against organised crime in Bulgaria now stand, there are no sufficient incentives for co-operation. The institutions define success and failure in different, sometimes mutually contradictory ways. There are no common patterns of reporting. There is still no common information system, which further undermines the possibilities for fruitful co-operation.
• Successful co-operation among the institutions now depends excessively on informal contacts among officials.
• The expectations of the public regarding the performance of the institutions are often unrealistic and impose excessive and sometimes irrational demands on them. This underlines the need for a rationalised public perspective on organised crime. One way to proceed ahead is to make public debates more inclusive. On the one hand, there is a need to make the expert knowledge accumulated in institutions more accessible to the public. On the other hand, more voices from the non-governmental sector need to be heard in order to articulate a balanced and non-paranoid public perspective on this important issue for Bulgaria.
