After the International Court of Justice said that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was not out of line with international law, Serbia took an ostensibly pragmatic line, vowing to pursue its campaign against Pristina’s regime peacefully and at the level of international diplomacy.

If anyone seriously hoped that this meant that Belgrade would opt for a desultory and subtle demarche while quietly adopting a live-and-let-live outlook, allowing the issue to recede discreetly while Serbia turned its main focus to its European Union hopes, that ill-informed illusion was shattered swiftly.

Serbia sent to the United Nations General Assembly a draft resolution that set in train a cycle of international diplomacy, indeed, but of the variety that had Belgrade, and not Pristina, as its focus.

Serbia insisted that this resolution had been the subject of consultation with the EU. As events unfolded, it remained unclear how deep that consultation had been, or at least, how deep had been the mutual understanding around that consultation.
 
Clause celebre
Many observers, at first reading, appeared relieved that the draft resolution did not explicitly call for talks about the status of Kosovo.

However, even without that hardy annual, the phrasing was divisive.

It was factual to state, as the resolution did, that "agreement has not been reached between the sides on the consequences of the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo from Serbia"; even, few could dispute – at abstract level – "that one-sided secession cannot be accepted as a way for resolving territorial issues" but it was the clause numbered 3 that caused all the trouble.

The draft asked the General Assembly to agree that it "decides to include in the interim agenda of the 66th session an item namely ‘further activities following the advisory opinion of the ICJ on whether the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo is in line with international law’."

If approved, as proposed, at the General Assembly session on Kosovo scheduled for September 9, these words could provide wide latitude for Serbia to have the question of the Pristina February 2008 declaration revisited for, in that dreaded cliché, the foreseeable future.
 
At home
In Belgrade, there were misgivings in domestic political circles. Votes won in parliament aside, the fact of domestic dissension about the conduct of the policy on Kosovo is a well-documented fact.

There are those who demand the hardest line possible; there are those who discreetly speak of compromise, mindful of the fact that – lip-service aside – the 27 member states of the EU are not collectively hankering to admit Serbia; and that should be considered not just in the context of individual views on Serbia, but in the context of policies collectively and individually about the principles of expanding the bloc.
 
Arrivals hall
Already not quiet in the comfiest seats of the waiting room for the EU, given that it quite often hears insistent messages about apparently elusive war criminals and an ineffectual battle against organised crime and corruption, Belgrade found itself on the receiving end of a succession of mighty messages, some in person, some not.

Germany’s foreign minister Guido Westerwelle came to Belgrade to say that Kosovo’s independence was a reality and the map of Europe already had been drawn (it will be a topic of fascination for historians centuries from now to conjure with these words spoken in August 2010), followed on August 31 by UK foreign secretary William Hague, the latter reportedly having stood with US secretary of state Hillary Clinton in a letter-writing campaign against Serbia’s resolution, saying that Belgrade in effect was refusing to accept the ICJ’s advisory opinion.

The juggernaut against the resolution was rolling. It cannot be forgotten that there was a significance to the fact that Westerwelle made the trip to Belgrade. His country is among the most well-disposed to the eventual admission of Serbia to the EU. Yet it was Westerwelle who, among other things, sharply criticised Belgrade for approaching the UN, when it should have taken the dispute to the European Parliament. Germany may be among the class of categories supporting both Serbia and Kosovo, an almost unlikely feat in current circumstances, but Berlin was making it clear that it would prefer the matter resolved this side of the Atlantic. While, at the same time, no one outside Moscow or Beijing was objecting to the principle of Washington having its say on the matter.
 
Belgrade brew
Serbia, which as noted had insisted that it had consulted the EU about the resolution, finished up firmly on the back foot.

By August 27, media reports were emerging about trying to find a compromise. Belgrade’s daily Politika said that Serbia and the EU were trying to find a way to modify the resolution.

The following day, Serbian president Boris Tadic confirmed that a delegation would be travelling to Brussels to discuss the draft resolution with EU officials.

Tadic, according to a report by Serbian news agency Tanjug, said that the objections to Serbia’s resolution did not come from any EU institutions, but from individual foreign ministries of member states. Separate reports suggested that among those with whom talks would be held was EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton.

"Serbia will never recognise Kosovo. That is a red line that we will not cross," Tadic was quoted as saying by Tanjug. At the same, he reiterated that no foreign politician ever had told him that recognising Kosovo was a condition for Serbia getting into the EU (to paraphrase Mandy Rice-Davies, well, they wouldn’t, would they?).

"We believe that our resolution is full of compromises. I believe that no one can be against negotiations," Tadic said.

Actually, they could. Pristina, for one, depending on what "negotiations" meant.
 
In Pristina
In Kosova daily Koha Ditore, the prime minister in Pristina, Hashim Thaci, wrote: "Kosovo is an independent state, sovereign, with its untouchable territorial integrity and is internationally recognised. Kosovo has moved forward and is continuing to move forward with comprehensive international support and in any circumstances there won’t be any turning back or remembering the past, in any circumstances there won’t be any territorial exchange, no autonomy, or talks with Serbia about the issue of Serbs in Kosovo".

Thaci continued: "We don’t have any open issues in the understanding for Kosovo to talk with Serbia. With Serbia we have concluded everything in June of 1999, with the declaration of Kosovo independence as an independent and sovereign state. Also, the world has closed the issue with the presentation of the ICJ opinion".
 
The numbers game
Two weeks from the proposed debate on September 9, the numbers were running against Serbia, according to media reports. And it was ever so that politics is a numbers game.

Unofficial estimates were on that on the draft resolution as tabled by Serbia, Belgrade could get 40 votes in favour – while Pristina was certain of 60 votes against. Separate reports suggested that some countries that wanted to stay out of the crossfire would simply find something else to do rather than be in the General Assembly either for the debate, or the vote, or both.

Meanwhile, as has become accustomed practice, top leaders in Pristina, having been convened by president Fatmir Sejdiu, were reported by Kosovo media to have held consultations with the ambassadors of the Quint states – the US, Germany, the UK, France and Italy.

As the days ticked by, one thing seemed clear, and another unclear, in almost equal measure. The first was that Serbia’s draft resolution seemed headed for defeat. The second was how Serbia’s international campaign, even with the backing of powerful international allies such as Russia and China – both permanent members of the UN Security Council – could proceed into a horizon that offered anything but frustration and futility.