Whatever its outcome, the final phase of the saga of the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty may be recorded by historians as having begun and ended in the British isles – with detours through Warsaw and Prague.

The yes vote in the Irish referendum on the treaty on October 2 means that 25 out of 27 EU members have approved Lisbon, the mammoth document that substantially rewrites how the bloc will work, among other things creating a powerful President of the European Council, foreign affairs chief and changes to the decision-making process.

The two holdouts at the time of the Irish referendum were Poland, where president Lech Kacynski was seen as eager to get more power for his office in EU affairs, as well as more influence for his country in the bloc, and the Czech Republic, where president Vaclav Klaus, an avowed Eurosceptic, had objections in principle to the changes that Lisbon would mean.

For all the uncertainty in the first days after the Irish vote as attention turned to Prague and Warsaw, the outcome of the referendum was welcomed enthusiastically in capitals of countries in South Eastern Europe that are still on the waiting list for EU accession.

Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia and Turkey were among the first EU wannabes to hail the Irish decision, seeing it as opening the way for enlargement that would directly benefit them.

But for the pro-Lisbon camp, any cheering may prove premature.

The Polish question
Those who want Lisbon to go ahead made much of Polish president Lech Kaczynski’s reported pledge that if Ireland said yes, he would – in the words of his spokesperson on October 3 – sign the treaty "forthwith" and "without unnecessary delay".

Ensuing days, however, saw conflicting reports in Polish media that Kaczynski might continue to hold off from signing the treaty, for two reasons – one to gain more power for his office, in relation to that of the prime minister, in EU affairs, the second to use the prospect of his signature as a bargaining chip to win concessions for Poland, not only in formal and informal influence in the bloc, but also on more immediate gains such as the portfolio that a future Polish European Commissioner would hold.

A sign that this may indeed have been the strategy that Kaczynski was pursuing was that reports that he would hold a news conference on the Lisbon Treaty question on October 5 were not confirmed. There was no need to rush the process of Poland’s ratification of the treaty, his office said instead.

By October 6, Polish media were reporting that Kaczynski would sign the treaty as early as the following day, in effect holding to his initial promise.