In its closing communique at the end of its September 24-25 Pittsburgh meeting, the G20 came to the pithy yet perhaps startling conclusion about its previously-agreed set of measures towards global economic recovery: "It worked".

It is true that it has become conventional wisdom that the world’s largest economies, notably the United States and the European Union – as a bloc – can be interpreted as on the mend. But with unemployment still at severely uncomfortably high levels, notably in some individual EU member states, with the fallout from defaulted mortgages continuing, and with ripple effects still being felt in economies much less significant than those of the G20 – Bulgaria’s, for one, the choice of phrase in the "leaders statement" seemed a tad too definitive.

Further, it was inevitable that the Pittsburgh summit would be quite different from its predecessors, notably London which actually produced quite a number of concrete steps.

One issue that got arguably the most media attention and was among the most difficult for the G20 was that of executive bonuses. In the end, the best agreement that could be achieved was that bank bosses’ bonuses should be linked to long-term performance resulting from their investment decisions, and that they should not be allowed guaranteed multi-year bonuses.

Those who had hoped to return from Pittsburgh with guidelines on capping bonuses, that could be turned into statute, were, probably inevitably, left empty-handed.

As difficult as it may seem to point to specific changes that will be the consequence of Pittsburgh, certain general directions were agreed, some of them deeply significant such as the continuation of stimulus packages until it can be said unequivocally that recovery has taken hold.

However, a reading of the communique indicates that this would be done at individual level, unless a forthcoming G20 summit comes up with a new consensus on simultaneous withdrawal – a scenario which given the diverse nature of even this group of the world’s 20 most important economies, seems unlikely.

Several aspects of the communique have a certain familiarity, such as the pledge to oppose protectionism and the commitment to improve the regulation, functioning and transparency of the financial system.

The latter is an issue about which many have had urgently-felt expectations ever since the nature of the global financial crisis became apparent, and this part of the Pittsburgh statement hardly seemed to take matters any further than had been heard previously; yet, there has been practically no real regulatory reform in the past year, notably in the US where it would be difficult to argue that anything has yet been put in place in regulatory terms that would effectively prevent a repeat of the crisis.

The communique is thin on new initiatives and decisive choices. The leaders agreed that there should be steps to ensure strong, sustainable and balanced growth, and to improve the quality and quantity of bank capital and discourage excessive leverage (it could be argued that, if enforced, this would no doubt benefit the long-term prospects of important European banks and their clients).

Then there is the list of noble goals, included given that several players have seen the G20 process as more than just one of reforming the financial system but also of reshaping the world economy for the better in the face of sensitive global issues such as poverty and climate change.

G20 leaders said that they would "spare no effort" to achieve a deal in
Copenhagen in December 2009 against further global warming, and said that through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, act to improve access to food, fuel and finance among the world’s poorest people.

The most crucial element to emerge from Pittsburgh may prove to be the changes agreed to that could bring some change at geo-political rather than purely financial level. These are the agreements to move towards changing representation in the control of the International Monetary Fund, and for the G20 to take the role of global economic pilot from the G8.

This latter change means much more than extending the life of the G20 beyond a periodic, crisis-driven combination global workshop and photo opportunity. However much it may be viewed with suspicion by anti-globalists and at least some economies in the category 21 and below, it means that a new era of formal consultation has opened, however much the disparate elements within that process may find that consensus eludes them.

The 2010 G20 meetings, in Canada in June and South Korea in November, will evidence whether the new status of the grouping will produce genuine initiatives and decisive guidelines, or yet another arena too unwieldy to be effective.