Marin Lessenski is programme director of the Sofia-based Institute for Regional and International Studies. He is a graduate of the Central European University in Budapest with an MA degree in South East European Studies. He has authored research on relations between Turkey and the EU, the EU and the Black Sea region, civil society in South East Europe and others.

A 2005 Europol report says Greece is third among the countries with terrorist organisations functioning on its territory. On May 30 this year, there was a bomb attack against the Greek minister of culture, for which Revolutionary Struggle took the responsibility. Revolutionary Struggle is said to aim to succeed the now-defunct organisation November 17 and to be Greece's most dangerous urban guerilla group.

Yes, these old types of leftist terrorist groups have functioned throughout Europe since the 70s and 80s of the 20th century, but Europe more or less managed to deal with them, while Greece didn't. The agenda of the Greek extremist groups is, I would say, rather exotic. Strong leftist moods and left parties have traditionally predominated in Greece. And this type of extremist Marxist wing remains in few other places of the world. There are such groups in Nepal and in Latin America. In Europe, however, as a whole, extremist sentiments that ran against the establishment have been dulled, and I can give you some examples of famous politicians who used to favour this extreme leftist ideology for changing the existing political economic order. There used to be, for example, that photo of former foreign minister of Germany Joschka Fischer fighting with police. Another renowned European politician - the current president of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso - used to be a Maoist. Javier Solana is another example. He used to be NATO secretary general and is now high EU representative on security and foreign affairs.

For a long time before, however, he used to lead the left camp in Spain, and as far as I know, he once went to Moscow to meet Leonid Brezhnev and establish warm relations with Russia. You see that now all of them have evolved to become respected politicians. So, this part of the leftist spectre in Greece, which is not involved in direct criminal acts, can also develop into something else - there are political mechanisms for dealing with this.

Moreover, they don't threaten the existing order and the political system in the country, unlike the new type of Islamic terrorists. They rather aim to achieve a social effect, although I don't want to belittle their actions. On the other hand, however, there cannot be a political process for them like there was in Spain or Northern Ireland, whose terrorist groups had more understandable, political goals.

Most Greek people think that their government is too mild toward Turkey. Do you think that the two factors - terrorism and public disapproval - can lead to a political destabilisation in Greece?

There are two types of sentiments in Greece. The first one is the nationalistic - Greece has traditionally been anti-Turk. People have been brought up to see Turkey as an enemy for many years, and it is the same with Bulgaria. These sentiments, however, have subsided since 1999, when the almost simultaneous earthquakes in the two countries gave rise to the so-called diplomacy of the earthquakes, which resuscitated relations between the two. The second public sentiment is leftist, but not extreme. Their view is that there is too much militarisation in the Aegean; that the instrumental use of Turkey as an enemy to mobilise public opinion is dangerous; and that problems should be solved through demilitarisation.

Do you think that demilitarisation is the way out of the situation in the Aegean?

I am not sure demilitarisation is possible at the moment. But there can at least be a better co-ordination between the two countries and a reduction of the military aspect. The situation right now is much different from what it was 10 years ago, when we had open confrontation and, again, talk of war about territorial waters. At the moment, however, Greece is not against Turkey's EU entry - on the contrary - and there is also an exchange of high-level visits between Greece and Turkey and a regeneration of economic relations. Moreover, the whole zone of northern Greece that is populated with Muslims and used to be militarised 10 years ago is now open. To a large extent, this solves the Muslim minority problem in Greece.

The Turkish and Greek transport corridors are also open. And, most importantly - there are contracts signed between the two about infrastructure projects. Gas will be transported from Turkey through Greece to the rest of southern Europe. These are very big, serious projects, involving a lot of money and international participation.

Last but not least is the so-called civil diplomacy - the meetings between representatives of the diplomatic society and NGOs. And there is already a joint masters degree in Greek-Turkish relations, where Greek students receive stipends to study in Turkey and vice versa. Greece and Turkey have too many common foreign policy interests right now to allow relations to deteriorate. The May 23 incident doesn't mirror a deeper tendency, and it won't lead to serious consequences. We should rather see this military incident in the context of improving political, economic, civil and scientific relations. Neither side intends to return to the pre-1999 status quo, I think.

So it is absurd to think that Greece or Cyprus may veto Turkey's EU negotiations?

They won't do that, but, de facto, Turkey is doing it on its own when it doesn't recognise Cyprus. If you don't recognise a country that is part of the EU, how do you lead negotiations with the EU? The Turkish politician who recognises Greek Cyprus will commit a political suicide, so no one can afford to begin this process. And Greek Cypriots, in their turn, spoiled the process of unification with their "no" in the referendum. Russia supports them in the UN Security Council. So this is a very big game, and we can't say that one incident will cause a complete turnover, on the contrary.

If Greece decides to refer the issue to the Hague, how would that affect relations between the two?

I don't believe they will; I don't think there is a point. The Hague won't lead to a significant change or resolution of whatever issue is existing between the two. The issue is rather a matter of Realpolitik, of negotiations and agreements.

Greek media says that Athens is afraid of what Turkey might do. If you open newspapers, you will see how everything is put into this conflict context. There was even a publication saying that the countries are at war. Is this tension founded?

I don't believe the incident will lead to some dramatic turnover. The media, of course, presents things in a different way. It will use this theses for political purposes, to mobilise public opinion. Manipulated nationalism is the easiest way to win public support. And the whole of Greek identity is built around this opposition to Turkey.

How will Turkey's actions in the Aegean affect its EU efforts?

This is a very serious question. The situation is complicated because there isn't a consensus regarding EU integration or, rather, the reforms that have to be taken in the name of EU integration in Turkey. Turkey has national interests that, I think, it will defend even if they harm their EU integration process. That is, they won't negotiate the way we, and all countries from Central and Eastern Europe, did. Turkey is a totally different thing. If the Kemalist establishment decides that Turkish national interests are at stake, they will discontinue the integration process. I mean this part of the establishment that doesn't like the government of current prime minister Erdogan.

And made an attempt against prime minister Erdogan?

I haven't heard of such a thing.

Greek media says that there was an attempt on his life that was thwarted, and that a coup is possible in Turkey.

The pro-western Kemalist military and bureaucratic establishment has governed Turkey from the time of Ataturk. For years on end, whenever a pro-Islamic government came, they made a military coup to return the country to its pro-western orientation. Of course, with the process of European integration, this military establishment started losing ground. The paradox is that they want to see the country as part of a Western community, but at the same time they realise that the growth of democratisation in Turkey opens the way to Islamists, even if those are moderate Islamists of the type of Erdogan. So they don't want to fulfil all EU conditions and give rights to minorities, because they are afraid that the country would fall apart to separatism Things are very complicated.