The Europes old and new, East and West, may be on a winding path to enhanced economic and political co-operation, but in another sphere - religion - tensions are seething. Struggles endure among and within Orthodox churches in the Balkans; beyond that, issues of religious freedom could bedevil regional integration, writes CLIVE LEVIEV-SAWYER.





THERE is a voice seldom heard on the subject of European Union expansion.

It is the voice of the church, a body that by its own brief should take a lead in the spiritual guidance of society. Yet, in the traditionally Orthodox countries - whether in the fast or slow lane for EU accession - little is heard on the subject. Why is this important? It matters because for everyone living in an EU aspirant country, or for that matter in a country already a member of the Union, there is the question of an evolving European identity. Yet, worse than failing to be part of the solution, the churches themselves appear part of the problem. Even the most cursory examination of the Orthodox churches of Central and Eastern Europe shows them to be currently inextricably bound up with national identity - in some cases, to the extent of aggravating international relations.

In Serbia and Macedonia, the orthodox churches indulge in regular wars of words over the question of the Macedonian church's quest for its autocephaly to be recognised. This dispute, which regularly draws in the respective governments, is taking place over and above the problem of the highly nationalistic identity of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which while not solely culpable, appears to have done much to compound religious and ethnic tensions in the former Yugoslavia.

Another example is the Greek Orthodox Church, which regularly is at the forefront of nationalistic exchanges of sniping with Turkey, most often over the question of Cyprus. In the past year, a delegation of Greek churchmen asked EuroMPs to ensure Turkey was never admitted to the European Union, on the grounds that Turkey was not a European country. Matters went much further when, in December, the head of the Greek Orthodox Church, Archbishop Christodolous described Turks as "barbarians" unfit for the EU. But this was too much for the Athens government, which officially distanced itself from Christodolous's statements - and said that it wanted the EU to be expanded to include Turkey.

Though in the case of all post-communist countries statistics must be regarded as anecdotal, there is no room to deny that there has been a return to the churches, and that to a greater or less degree they have regained some persuasive moral force in society.

Yet at the same time, they are divided among themselves, ironically in part precisely because of what happened under communism.

In Bulgaria, the rise of an alternative synod in opposition to Bulgarian Orthodox Church Patriarch Maxim was because his opponents labelled him as a communist stooge. The Serbian Orthodox Church head, Pavle, as recently as this month said that communists had been behind the Macedonian Orthodox Church's 1967 unilateral declaration of independence. And these accusations are only part of the way that the communist past disrupted the life and future of the church. Analysts of the Orthodox churches in the former Soviet bloc have pointed out that the reason that most Russian, Ukrainian and other Orthodox churchmen in the region view ecumenism with such suspicion is that the Kremlin in the old days in fact sponsored "ecumenism" - as a kind of "unite and rule" strategy.

Further complicating matters is that in most Central and Eastern European countries, laws on recognition of churches and church-related organisations have been or are being put in place. Religious freedom lobbyists, which regularly produce voluminous reports based on their tracking of such legislation, point out that often such legislation effectively favours one church in a country. Usually, it is that church which is also wrapped up with national identity. Just how sinful that is, is a matter for debate; but the real question is whether among EU aspirant countries, such laws are permissible. Bulgaria's Law on Religious Denominations, in effect since last year, has been the subject of a barrage of criticism from foreign governments and human rights organisations, for the preferential place it gives to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. And, in the case of each country in Central and Eastern Europe which has produced such laws, revising them is not just a question of effectively conferring rights of equality of religion and worship, because entwined with the issue is that of the ownership of property. In Bulgaria, for example, the rights conferred by the religions law effectively guarantees the mainstream Bulgarian Orthodox Church a place as one of the country's biggest and wealthiest landowners - much to the chagrin of the alternative synod. In Bulgaria, further developments on the issue appear inevitable, given that the mainstream church has the right in law to request the police to evict alternative synod officials and members from property to which the mainstream church lays claim. Given the history of violent clashes between the mainstream and alternative synods, notwithstanding the rapprochements reached between them in recent years, there is a risk that tensions could flare again into violent clashes.

A topicality regarding the question of problems with regard to religious freedom in Bulgaria is given by at least one of the criticisms levelled against the country.

In August last year, Christopher Smith, chairman of the US Helsinki Commission, said, "As Bulgaria prepares to assume the chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe in January, it is troubling that the religion law fails to fulfil all OSCE commitments to religious freedom."

A picture of mixed progress in religious freedom in the Balkans and Central Europe emerges from the International Religious Freedom Report 2003, issued by the US State Department.

The report, compiled by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, covers the period from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003.

Among its key findings was a rise in anti-Semitism, notably in European countries, and some countries in Central and Eastern Europe were specifically criticised for this.

The section on Bosnia-Herzegovina said the constitution of the state and its two entities provided for religious freedom.

"Individuals generally enjoy this right in ethnically mixed areas or in areas where they are adherents of the majority religion, however, adherents of minority religions in non-ethnically mixed areas have had their right to worship restricted, sometimes violently."

Bulgaria, according to the report, in practice restricted religious freedom for some non-Orthodox groups, in spite of the provisions of the constitution.

As to Croatia, the report noted that while there was no official state religion, the Roman Catholic Church enjoyed a historic relationship with the state not shared by other religious groups. The positions of the Muslim community and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia had improved after agreements with the state, which granted benefits similar to those enjoyed by the Roman Catholic Church.

In Greece, non-Orthodox groups sometimes faced administrative obstacles or legal restrictions on religious practice.

In Macedonia, there had been an improvement in the status of religious freedom, the report said. Officials had toned down their rhetoric and reconciliation had been promoted. There were no attacks on churches or mosques during the period covered by the report.

Government policy in Moldova continued to contribute to the generally free practice of religion, but the Moldovan Orthodox Church was getting special treatment from the government. Disputes among various branches of Orthodox churches continued, and there was one reported case of the desecration of a Jewish cemetery.

In Romania, while the government generally respected religious freedom, in practice there were some restrictions.

"Several minority religious groups continued to claim credibly that low-level government officials impeded their efforts at proselytizing, as well as interfered with other religious activities."

In May 2003, the Romanian government decided after a series of delays to enforce a 2000 Supreme Court ruling requiring that Jehovah's Witnesses be recognised as an official religion. "Although this represents a major step forward, it does not solve recognition problems in general."

The government had made no further effort towards adopting a new law regulating religions. In June 2002, Romania's parliament approved a law restituting church property held by the state but its implementation had been slow. The law does not address churches that belonged previously to the Greek Catholic Church and now are held by the Orthodox Church.

The Romanian Orthodox Church had shown some hostility towards non-Orthodox religious churches and had criticized the "aggressive proselytizing" of Protestant, neo-Protestant, and other groups, which the Orthodox Church repeatedly described as "sects".

In Russia, "religious matters are not a source for societal hostility for most citizens, although many citizens firmly believe that at least nominal adherence to the Russian Orthodox Church is at the heart of what it means to be Russian".

There were manifestations of anti-Semitism, and hostility in society towards Roman Catholics and newer, non-Orthodox religions. Leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church had stated publicly their opposition to the presence of Catholics, Protestants, and other newer religion in the country.

In Serbia and Montenegro, the Jewish community reported an increase in anti-Semitic incidents, primarily involving hate speech and vandalism.

"Jewish leaders and leaders of other minority religious communities often relate acts of vandalism to negative media reporting towards sects, known as 'cults'," the report said. Police and government officials had taken some positive steps against hate speech and vandalism.

In the Slovak Republic, there was a generally amicable relationship among religions, but anti-Semitism persisted among some elements of the population, the report said.

From the report, the latest in a succession from various groups monitoring religious freedom, and from other incidents and news reports, a picture emerges of Europe, or more than one Europe, deeply fractured on religious lines; and in some cases, relations between churches becoming worse, not better.

At a time when top-level church leaders are desperately engaged in a campaign to get the future European constitution to recognise Europe's "Christian legacy" it is a challenge to assess what that legacy means today.