THERE was an obvious symbolism in the fact that, as the US ultimatum to Saddam Hussein which finally polarised the world into two camps ran close to expiry, it was Warsaw that became the latest state to announce it was committing a small military contingent to back up the US-led invasion forces.

After all, the Polish capital city lent its name to the Warsaw Pact, one of the icons of a world order now passed. The decision by Warsaw to send military help, perhaps recognising the Iraq war as a turning point in history, is a symbol of its quest to secure its place in the new order.

Poland was among countries that went the furthest in its commitment, with reports this week that special forces were photographed operating among US-led forces in Iraq.

But if polls are to be believed, the decision to dispatch members of a chemical regiment and deploy a navy ship in the Persian Gulf ran counter to the bulk of Polish public opinion, with 69 per cent reported against doing so at the time the troop commitment was made.

This is a contradiction that may be extrapolated almost throughout Eastern Europe.

Most countries in the region apparently believed, and in so doing appeared to share the unspoken motivation of Bulgaria's Government, that this juncture in history was an appropriate time to be seen to be on the side of Washington. Any rift with the rest of Europe could be left to time and diplomacy to heal.

It is, after all, not a bad bet to ensure being on good terms with President George W . Bush's administration. US opinion polls currently would seem set to project him into a second term in office. That means friendly countries might feel reasonably confident about a warm relationship with the White House at least until 2008. In making political calculations, governments are likely to take the popularity of the president into account, rather than the popularity of the war.

An expert on Central and Eastern Europe, James Derleth of New Orleans' Tulane University, told The Echo that there were "principled and practical" reasons behind the support given by countries for Bush's coalition.

"Principally, these countries have experienced the oppression of authoritarian regimes and thus have some sympathy for the US argument that removing the Baathist regime means liberating the Iraqi people.

"Practically, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can see that the US is the most powerful state in the world and that rhetorical support can only improve their standing in the eyes of Washington," Derleth said.

For some, the moment of choice also appeared to present a moment of opportunity.

Reportedly, in talks with the US about opening its airspace to US and British warplanes, Macedonia tried to secure Washington's support for recognition of its name.

Such an endorsement, the bid for which was never officially confirmed, did not come to pass. Instead, the opening of airspace was rewarded with a US promise to Skopje of a much less valuable prize, support for its bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). When the war is over, Washington will not have to contend with a government in Athens irked by what would have been powerful backing for Macedonia on an extremely vexed issue.

Count the countries in Bush's "Coalition of the Willing" and you will find Eastern Europe well represented, making up nine out of the first list of 30, and that, for the sake of geographical clarity, is not counting Baltic or former Soviet states.

On paper, for few of them is there any real economic risk of signing up with the coalition. Deploying an anti-nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) unit to the sidelines of a war which in any case is none too close to their own countries, does not drain much from the exchequer. Nor does opening airspace. There might even be spin-offs for some - reportedly, in the past month, the US spent a hefty sum fixing up installations and an airfield in Romania. Rather as Bulgaria is collecting a tidy sum in rent for the use of Sarafovo airfield and military base.

But to consider things this way is to look only at the budget balance sheet.

Marin Lessenski, programme director of the Institute for Regional and International Studies in Sofia, says virtually every government in the region which has supported the coalition has taken a domestic political risk by doing so.

"I haven't seen exact figures of opinion polls, except for Bulgaria, but the situation is similar. The public in general, as elsewhere in Europe, does not support military action. By defying public attitude, the governments are very vulnerable to attacks by the opposition - especially if the war goes terribly wrong and there are casualties - allied troops, civilians and among the Central and Eastern Europe countries' contingents," he said.

Derleth does not share this view.

Asked which governments were taking a particular political risk, he responded: "I am not familiar enough with each government's position to comment on this question. However, since none of the countries in the region is contributing much more than rhetorical support, the domestic cost should not be too great, even if the Iraqi invasion is unsuccessful".

To return to Poland, the start of the Iraq war coincided with the zloty hitting a 40-month low against the dollar, with commentators naming the vulnerability of the government as among key factors.

The country is working hard to shore up its public finances through a new fiscal reform programme, in the hope that it will meet its targets to become a European Union member in May 2004. A referendum is to be held on EU accession in June, and with unemployment climbing, the government can afford few risks unless it is prepared to contend with a possible protest vote.

It is little wonder that prime minister Leszek Miller last week was at pains to point out that the contingent being sent to the Gulf would be limited to providing logistical support, a statement subsequently contradicted by the reports about troops operating within Iraqi territory.

Poland's response after the invasion began was to issue a foreign ministry statement describing the use of force as a last resort that had become a necessity in the light of the failure of diplomatic efforts.

In the Czech Republic, the situation is slightly different, but no less risky in domestic political terms. Deployment of a Czech unit was authorised by a resolution approved by Parliament that made participation in a war in Iraq conditional on the authorisation of a UN resolution, unless Iraq used weapons of mass destruction against its neighbours or the forces ranged against it.

Ahead of the invasion, the Czech government said it would clarify its position only when the assault started. This prompted the largest opposition party to urge it to plump for the side of the US-led forces, while the communist opposition urged it to take heed of the well-supported anti-war demonstrations in Prague and to not be drawn any further into Washington's campaign.

An opinion poll on the eve of the war said that 71 per cent of Czechs opposed a US invasion of Iraq. If this figure is reliable, it put the Czech government in an unenviable position: to go along with its opposition and commit, or to sense the mood in the streets and disentangle itself from involvement with the coalition, and by so doing to risk losing the next election anyway.

In the days after last week's opening bombardment of Baghdad, fancy footwork was the order of the day among Czech leaders.

President Vaclav Klaus said that, in spite of his country being listed as among the coalition, it was not, and he said he regretted that the crisis had not been solved through diplomacy. But at the same time Klaus said he hoped the military operation would succeed quickly, with minimum civilian loss of life.

In a subsequent interview with a Czech daily, Klaus took issue with the view held by Bush and British prime minister Tony Blair that the nature of the regime in Iraq was reason in itself to justify its ousting.

Czech foreign minister Cyril Svoboda, who had said before the attack that his country would be on the side of the coalition, subsequently qualified this by saying that being on the side of the coalition did not necessarily mean being a member of the coalition.

Domestic fallout was directed particularly against Svoboda, with anti-war protesters calling for his axeing.

The first days of the attack saw Czech opinion registered as 70 per cent against the war.

Presumably mindful of the split on the issue between the US and some European countries, prime minister Vladimir Spidla described the Czech Republic's position as halfway between the two.

The Czech Republic was tight-lipped about its response to calls to expel Iraqi diplomats, with Spidla saying that his government would make its own independent decision.

In Hungary, former premier Viktor Orban spoke for the opposition when he said the government was on the wrong side in supporting the US, given that polls claimed that 92 per cent of Hungarians were against a war on Iraq.

Last Thursday, Budapest underlined its support for Bush's coalition by announcing the cabinet had given the go-ahead for US and British warplanes to traverse Hungarian airspace, sparking some controversy by holding that parliamentary approval was not required for the decision. Hungary would not send troops to the war, the government decided earlier.

Hungarian prime minister Peter Medgyessy, speaking on March 20, said the US-led military strike had been launched only after attempts at a diplomatic solution had failed.

Yet the ambivalence within Hungary symbolised the country's refusal to heed the US request, made to countries worldwide, to expel Iraqi diplomats.

As tensions about the Iraq issue continued, opposition politician Zsolt Nemeth hit out at the government for failing to take steps to have Hungary's name removed from the list of the coalition.

In Romania, prime minister Adrian Nastase put himself in the front line of Bush's backers, saying that the ultimatum put to Saddam before the invasion had been the appropriate way to proceed.

Like Bulgaria, Romania is not without a financial interest in the outcome of the battle for Baghdad, because it is also owed repayment on a loan some time in arrears.

Romania's Social Democratic Party government also appears to be in a position to proceed with some confidence, given its secure position in the polls, and with most pundits predicting victory for it in the polls which are at least a year and a half away.

Romania made international headlines when it expelled Iraqi diplomats, effectively accusing them of espionage. Its support for the US-led campaign includes the provision of airspace and the use of the Mihail Kogalniceanu air base as an "air bridge" for troops headed to the gulf.

After the start of hostilities, the office of Romanian president Ion Iliescu said that by backing the attack on Iraq, Romania was acknowledging the need to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, while Romania's cabinet office said it hoped military operations would be quick, inflict minimal suffering on civilians, and succeed in eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

Albania's government has been unequivocal in its backing, offering troops, airfields, and bases, with its prime minister, Fatos Nano, effusive in his support of the US.

Serbia-Montenegro, which has vivid memories of international intervention, having this week marked the fourth anniversary of the bombing campaign against Belgrade, reacted to the overture to war in Iraq with a statement "deeply deploring" the fact that a solution had not been found through the UN.

"International relations must be based on generally accepted principles of international law," the Serbian-Montenegrin ministry of foreign affairs said.

While this statement could be read as reproachful in tone towards the US, it did not take Serbia-Montenegro long to act in accordance with the US call regarding Iraqi diplomats, with Belgrade expelling two Iraqi envoys on March 20.

But with the aftermath of the assassination of former Serbian prime minister Doran Djindjic uppermost in the minds of most in the former Yugoslavia, it appeared that Iraq was no more than a sideshow in domestic politics.

Slovakia, where polls show much of the population opposed to the use of force against Saddam, issued a clarification after the invasion began, saying that the deployment of an NBC unit and the overflight rights given to the US were in line with previous UN resolutions.

Slovak prime minister Mikulas Dzurinda urged the country to show greater support for the attack on Iraq, saying the US should not be left to stand alone to defend democracy.

From Croatia came some of the strongest anti-war views from a head of state, with President Stipe Mesic describing the attack as lacking legitimacy. While Croatia would remain friends with the US, he said, it could not accept a world where those who possessed the capacity to do so, could take military action against the government of another country.

With Croatia appearing to want to ingratiate itself with "Old Europe" and with the US, the response last week from US ambassador Lawrence G. Rossin was stinging: "We are talking about war and peace. However, your government has decided to shirk its responsibility and play a reserved role," he told the independent weekly Globus.

The vexed political context in the region, and the range of responses, raises the question of relations among Eastern European countries, and between those countries and the rest of Europe, in relation to EU eastward expansion.

Lessenski noted that in the Balkans, there were the "paralyses" of NATO and the planned European Security and Defence Policy, by which EU forces were supposed to take over peace-keeping in the Balkans.

"The transatlantic and intra-European drifts will further complicate the resolution of problems in the region."

He said the implications for European Union candidate countries which had committed support in one form or another to the US-led attack was "already negative".

"France found a pretext to hinder an enlargement it did not support enthusiastically anyway. It also confirms the suspicion of the creation of a 'British camp' among the newcomers to slow down deepening of the Union."

Derleth does not have the same view.

"Although (French president Jacques) Chirac has in effect warned EU candidate members that they are not yet members and that their behaviour could have an impact on admittance, since the EU is split on the Iraqi issue, I don't think there will be any impact on EU eastward expansion.

"As the current negotiations with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, etc, show, the key issues are economic - subsidies and protectionism - not political, " Derleth said.