Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic
Lenard J. Cohen
Westview Press

Serpent in the bosom describes Slobodan Milosevic's rule of Serbia from the late 1980s to the autumn of 2000 when he lost the presidential elections to Vojislav Kostunica.

It is, however, not only a biography of Milosevic. Cohen does describe his career within the communist party and his rise to absolute power, as well as his pattern of rule and his inevitable political demise. But he not only gives a clear insight into the mechanisms and controls of this political opportunist, he also describes the role of the opposition and its leaders, gives an overview of the economy and describes in detail the war with NATO. I would call his book therefore a short history of modern Yugoslavia.

One of the most interesting and tragic facets of Milosevic is that he was able to convince a large segment of the Serb population that he would advance their national interests in the Balkans, while in fact he devoted his attention mainly to the retention of power at any cost. He would prove to be the most successful Yugoslav communist functionary to exploit ethnic nationalism as a political tool.

Although Milosevic was a devoted follower of Tito ("statements by Milosevic amounted to little more than ritualistic incantations of accepted Titoist orthodoxy," Cohen notes), he also thought Serbian communists should liberate themselves from a sense of guilt about their historic nationalism.

Milosevic was transformed in a few years from a cautious and reserved apparatchik to someone who used nationalism and socialism to build a dictatorship. His image as a defender of Serbian interests made him popular among the masses. He tricked both the communists and the nationalists. The communists believed he was only pretending to be a nationalist and the nationalists believed he was only pretending to be a communist.

Within the party leadership he gained popularity because he reminded the "old guard" of themselves, when they were young. According to Ivan Stambolic, Milosevic's mentor, they liked his vigor, acuteness and his revolutionary style. "Also he consulted them, he pleased them." In this way, Milosevic established his own important network.

Cohen gives a number of other reasons for Milosevic's popularity and his ability to maintain power. First, he managed to use individual opposition leaders for his own purposes, thus splitting the opposition. Second, Serbian political culture is traditionally conservative. Third, Milosevic was able to use the organisational structure of the former League of Communists (to which the opposition had no access).

Finally, Milosevic dominated the most powerful media outlets. At the end of his regime, the "soft dictatorship" of Milosevic was getting harder and harder. The regime stepped up warnings to institute security measures against what they called "media aggression."

Furthermore, in July 2000, constitutional provisions were adopted that provided for the direct election of the president. Also the members of the Upper Chamber were to be directly elected, instead of by the Serbian and Montenegrin Assemblies. "Milosevic effectively pushed Montenegro out of the federal electoral process, thereby making it harder for opposition forces to win control of the federal presidency and the federal legislature."

Ultimately, contrary to his expectations, this led to the meltdown of Milosevic and his regime. He could not believe that the opposition would unite and present one leader to oppose him in the 2000 elections. The not very charismatic Vojislav Kostunica soon took the lead in all opinion polls. His ultimate victory has been mainly attributed to his record as an uncorrupt democratic nationalist. "Dawn," in Kostunica's own words, "was finally coming to Yugoslavia."